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Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases
George P. Fletcher
I. The Presumption of Innocence: Were it So

Good men everywhere praise the presumption of innocence.1 And be
they Frenchmen, Germans, or Americans, they agree on the demand
of the presumption in practice. Both here and abroad, the state's invo-

cation of criminal sanctions demands a high degree of proof that the
accused has committed the offense charged. To express the requisite
standard of proof, common lawyers speak of the prosecutor's duty to

prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 And Continental lawyers
invoke the maxim in dubio pro reo-a precept requiring triers of fact
to acquit in cases of doubt.8
t

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A. 1960, University of

California; J.D. 1963, M.C.L. 1965, University of Chicago.
1. The presumption of innocence is a standard clause in international declarations and
covenants on fundamental human rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10,
1948, art. 11(2), U.N. Doc. A1811, reprinted in 43 Ams. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949); Euro.
pean Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 22B (1955).
In the United States, the presumption of innocence has found expression in a number of
state statutes, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1956), N.Y. CODE OF Ca. PROc. § 389
(McKinney 1958), and the Supreme Court once held that federal courts must Instruct
criminal juries that the presumption of innocence favors the accused. Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). But cf. United States v. Agnew, 165 U.S. 36 (1897), United
States v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1941).
The footnotes below discuss the presumption of innocence in France and Germany;
for a study of the presumption in the Soviet Union, see my paper, The Presumption of
Innocence in the Soviet Union, to be published in the June 1968 issue of the U.C.LA.
Law Review.
2. The common law presumption of innocence emerged independently of the rule
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption first appears in private disputes, e.g., Williams v. East India Co., 3 East 192, 102 Eng. Rep. 571 K.B. 1802); R. v.
Hawkins, 10 East 211, 103 Eng. Rep. 755 (1808), as a rationale for requiring the phntiff
to prove a negative proposition, e.g., as in Williams, that the defendant failed to warn
plaintiff that he was transporting a combustible item on plaintiff's ship. The rule that
the prosecutor had to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt developed independently.
See L. MACNALLY, TiE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 398 (1811). In the
1850's, American judges began to equate the presumption with the rule on the prosecu.
tor's burden of persuasion. Patterson v. State, 21 Ala. 571 (1852), State v. Tibbetts, 35
Maine 81 (1852). English and American commentators recognized the link in the decades
following. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON TnE LAW OF Evir.NCE § 29 (2d ed. 1814) (the
first edition, published in 1842, discussed the presumption of innocence (at 39) without
relating it to the degree of proof required in criminal cases). J. STE1itEN, A DiGEsT or Tim
LAw OF EvIDENCE, art. 94 (1876), 1 P. TAYLOR, TREATisE ON THE LAw oF EvIDENCE 133
(1887).
3. The maxim is not mentioned in French or German legislation. The French derive
the maxim directly from the presumption of innocence. 2 P. BouzAT & J. PINATEL, TRArl'
DE DROIT PANAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 913 (1963); J. Patarin, Le particularisme de la thdoria
des preuves en droit pdnal, in G. STEFANI, QUELQUES ASPECTS DE L'AUTONOMIE DU DROIT
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The French speak of the prdsomption d'innocence;4 and the Germans
of the Unschuldsvermutung.5 By duplicating existing rules on the
prosecutorial burden of persuasion, these rubrics provide rhetorical

affirmation of the long-standing Western concern that only the guilty
should suffer under the criminal law.0 This concern prompted Hale to
remark in the late 1600's that five guilty men should be acquitted before
one innocent man is convicted. 7 This kind of ratio, expressing tolera-

tion for acquitting the guilty, has become a stock figure of common law

PnNAL 38-39 (1956). The Germans, who began to apply the maxim in dublo pro reo long

before they recognized the presumption of innocence, have devised a number of legal
rationale for the maxim. At least six are current:
(1) The maxim derives from Section 261 of the Strafprozessordnung [StP0] (Code
of Criminal Procedure), which provides that triers of fact should evaluate evidence
freely, unrestrained by rules ranking competing kinds of evidence (Urie Beweswfirdigung). See Seibert, In dubio pro reo, 4 DEuTscim 1rcirrs-ZErrsc mirr 557 (19.49); 1
LoEwE-RosENBERG, Dm STRAFPROZESSORDNUN § 261, Comment 4, at 1067 (21st ed. 1963).
(2) The maxim derives from StPO § 244 (2), which requires that courts, sitting as
triers of fact, investigate all pertinent matters, including matters not put forwvard
either by the prosecution or the defense. 2 E. ScmmTmr, Lmiao.r.,%-r A zwt STRA'PROZESSORDNUNC, § 244, Comments 10-12, at 669-70 (1957) ('the duty to investigate the
facts entails the duty to determine the facts unequivocally").
(3) The maxim derives from StPO § 267 (1), which requires that a judicial finding
of guilt be supported by an opinion "setting forth the facts deemed proved." H.
HENKEL, SnuvasAE
AxsF acrT 405-06 (1953).
(4) The maxim has the status of customary law. E. KERN, SmAa'nmTAnnrsncrrr 64
(8th ed. 1967).
(5) The maxim is a restatement of the principle that no man should be punished
unless he is guilty-nulla poena sine culpa. IV. STREE, IN DUmo PrO Rro 15-16 (1962).
(6) The maxim is entailed by concept of a Recltsstaat-a state based on law. D.
Mann & U. Mann, Die Anwendbarkeit des Grundsatzes "in dubio pro reo" auf Pro.
zessvoraussetzungen, 76 ZErTscHi-r FOR DEE GEsArrE S
zAtRrcirrsxw,%'
siLrT 264,
272ff- (1964).
4. The French prdsomption dinnocence derives from Section 9 of the 1789 Dedaration
of the Rights of Man, which begins: Tout hoinme dtant presuine innocent jusqu'a ce
qu'il ait dtd diclard coupable. .. (Because everyone is presumed innocent until proven
guilty.. .). L. DUGurr, H. MoNmER & R. BONNARD, Ls CONsmrrunONS DE LA, FeANCE DzEUs
1789, at 2 (7th ed. 1952). The entire 1789 Declaration has current status as droit consti.
tutionnel by incorporation in the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution. P. CQtrn t. & B.
CHAPMAN, TAE CONSTITUTION OF TBlE FIFTH REPuBLIC 11 (2d ed. 1959).

5. The phrase Unschuldsvermutung (innocence-presumption) may be found in the
literature prior to the Second World War, e.g., J. VAstA, DAs Sn raozssnrnrr 33.34
(1885) (deriving the maxim in dubio pro reo from a presumption of innocence); A. vo.
FTIERBAcH, LEHRBUCH DES PEmN-ucEmN Rrcsrrs 397 (11th ed. 1832) (reference to a rechtliche Vermutung der Unschuld (a legal presumption of innocence)). Generally, however,
pre-war German scholars rejected the Unschuldsvermutung as a misuse of legal terminology. K. MosER, IN DUBTO PRO Rno 77. Since 1952, the presumption of innocence establihed
by art. 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights has had the status of domestic
law in the German Republic. Ratifying law of August 7, 1952, [1952] Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGB1.] II 685, 953. See Schorn, Comment, 1963 DEuTscHE RmrMR ZErrUNo 339; W~oesner,
Die Menschenrechtskonvention in der deutschen Strafrechtspraxis, 1961 NruE JtLntswc
WocHENscHRIFr 1381.

6. Specifically, the presumption exhorts triers of fact not to acknowledge the high
probability that a man is guilty if he is so regarded by the police and prosecution. See
Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. R,. 1, 12 (1964); 9 J. Wisonr,
EvmENcE 406-09 (3d ed. 1940). See generally J. THAYER, A PRULwIwARY TRrATL ON Ev.DEncE 551-76 (1898).
7. M. HALE, PLEAs OF =H CaowN 289 (1694).
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rhetoric; Blackstone raised the ratio to ten to one," and others of
libertarian sentiment have favored twenty to one.9 Like the presumption of innocence, these ratios express a commitment to the dignity
of the individual. Expressed in many media, the message of that commitment remains the same: the interests of the individual ought not
readily yield to the supposed benefits of applying criminal sanctions.
If the commitment of Western legal systems to the principle that only
the guilty should suffer criminal sanctions is expressed in a medley of
rules, rubrics and metaphors, it is nonetheless a commitment that "doth
protest too much." For all the rhetoric and the ratios of freed criminals
to convicted innocents, we, and especially we in the United States, do
not live fully attuned to our commitment; we do not invariably require
acquittal in cases of doubt on critical issues in the criminal process.
"But we do demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt," the faithful
will insist. And it is true that we do-in some cases. It is always the case,
both here and abroad, that the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused fired a homicidal bullet or that the accused
set the match to a barn consumed in flames. On these issues, we are
indeed faithful to the policy of certainty in imposing criminal sanctions; any other approach-say the demand that the suspected murderer
prove that it wasn't he who fatefully pulled the trigger-would trouble
the conscience of Frenchmen and Californians alike.
Despite this occasional solidarity of fair treatment, there is a range
of issues on which courts, both here and abroad, depart from the policy
of giving the accused the benefit of the doubt. If, for example, the
defendant claims that he killed in self-defense, he may be convicted in
many prominent common law jurisdictions despite the jury's reasonable
doubts whether he did in fact act in self-defense; indeed, in those courts

the defendant must go so far as to prove his claim of self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.10 Further, if he claims that he acted
8. 4 BLAcKsTrONE, COMMENTARIES *358;
1965) (also favoring ten to one).

cf. L.

ROSENBERG,

DiE

BEwEISLASr

92 (5th ed,

9. FoRTEscuE, DE LAuDiBus LEGut ANG'ouA ch. 27 (in capital cases). Frederick the Great
is said to have invoked the same ratio. 1 LOEWE-ROSENBrRO, Dm SmTrPnozEssoRDNuuo 623
(1963). See generally G. WiuLuAivs, PROOF OF GUILT 151-58 (2d ed. 1955).
10. Brock v. State, 237 Ark. 73, 371 S.W.2d 539 (1963); Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114,
110 A.2d 445 (1955); Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 334, 63 S.W.2d 292 (1933); Perry
v. State, 234 Md. 48, 197 A.2d 133 (1964); State v. Grainger, 223 N.C. 716, 28 S.F.d 228
(1943); Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio 36, 117 N.E. 12 (1917); State v. Reid, 3 Ohio App. 2d 215,
210 N.E.2d 142 (1965); Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411 (1964), State
v. Morrison, 121 S.C. 11, 113 S.E. 304 (1922), criticized, 21 Mlcff. L. REv. 203 (1922); State
v. Mellow, 107 A. 871 (R.I. 1919), noted in 33 HARV. L. REv. 609 (1920); Thomas v. State,
210 Tenn. 297, 358 S.W.2d 315 (1962); cf. Pompe, 4a preuve en procddure pdnalo, 1961
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROrr PNAL CoMPAPO& 269, 282-83 (Dutch author ex.

pressly favoring a rule requiring the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion on self.
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under duress" or while intoxicated' or while suffering from insane
delusions, 13 he is called upon in many common law and civilian courts
to persuade the judge or jury of his claim. In these and in several

other instances, ubiquitous in the United States and in Western Europe,
the defendant is not protected by our traditional, deep concern for
shielding the innocent from criminal sanctions.

Thus there are two categories of issues. There are some that the

prosecutor here and abroad must prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
and others that are treated differently from court to court. The first
category is typified by the fact of death in a homicide prosecution; and
the second by the issues of self-defense and insanity. Though we can

illustrate the two categories with examples, there seems to be no basis
for distinguishing the two in principle. It is not that the prosecutor
must only prove affirmative issues; for example, he uniformly bears the

risk of residual doubt on the charge that the defendant failed to perform a duty to render aid to another.'4 Historically, certain issues have
become closely associated with the prosecutor's case, and these he must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The core of the prosecutor's case
consists of well-defined categories: (1) the occurrence of the social harm,
e.g., death, loss of property, the fact of loitering; (2) the defendant's

defense). Accord, 1 P. BoUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRAT DE DROrr PENAL Er DE Cw5n0LOrE 275
t Er rnoc-ounn
(1963); 2 id. 914 n.4; 2 G. STEF1XI & G. LEVASSEUR, DRorr PENAL ON
PkNALE 22 (2d ed. 1964).
11. The leading (and virtually only) common law case is State v. Sappienm, 84 Ohio
63, 95 N.E. 381 (1911); Accord, Judgment of December 29, 1949, f1950] Semaine Juridique
[Sem. Jur.] I, No. 5614 (Cour de Cassation Criminelle [Cass. crim.], Fr.). See also Owo
JuDICiAL CONFERENCE, OHIo JuRY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.60; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 2.00(2), 35.35
(McKinney 1967); 9 J. WIGMORE, EvmENc 417 n.4 (3d ed. 1940).
12. E.g., State v. Linzmeyer, 248 Iowa 31, 79 NA.V2d 206 Ql956); State v. Quigley, 135
Maine 435, 199 A. 269 (1938); State v. Kelly, 216 N.C. 627, 6 S.E.2d 533 (1940); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948).
T
13. For a survey of U.S. jurisdictions that is still current, see H1 W unor~m, MErrAL
DisoRDER AS A C mnNAL DEFENSE 212-72 (1954). The French courts are equivocal on the
issue. 2 P. BOUZAT & J. PiNATEL, supra note 10, at 914 nA (1953); cf. 2 G. Sa'AnI & G.
LEVASSEUR, supra note 10, at 22.
14. Lord Halifax's Case, reported without date in F. MuLLaa, INtmoDUCroN To LAw
AT Nisi PRIUs 298 (Ist ed. 1772) (defendant charged with having failed to delivcr up the

rolls of the auditor of the Exchequer; the court imposed the burden of persuasion on
the prosecution with the rationale "a person should be presumed to execute his office
until the contrary appears'); cf. R v. Hawkins, 10 East 211, 103 Eng. Rep. 755 (K.B.
1808). Both Continental and common law scholars reject the relevance of the positive/
negative distinction in allocating the burden of persuasion. Reinide, Comment, 1949
NEuE JuassuscHE WocxNscmu r 556; Geyer, Der .eeweis im Strafprozs, at 211, in
1 F. VON HOLTZENDORFF, HANDBUCH DE DFuTscHEN STRAiRozEssEs (2d ed. 1879); Patarin,
supra note 3, at 23; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment at 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
G. Wnlfmis, CasiNAr LAw 876 (2d ed. 1961). Nonconsent is a negative factor that the
prosecution must often prove. See, e.g., BAR Ass'N OF Tn Dizs-mcr or COLU.mI, Juny
INSTRUCMTONS FOR T Dis-truxr OF CoL ru, Instruction no. 111 (1956) (prosecution must
prove that the use of another's automobile was not authorized by the owner); cf. the

absence of necessity in abortion prosecutions, note 17 infra.
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causal responsibility for the harm; 15 and, under the present state of the
the law here and abroad, (3) the fact of the defendant's intent to inflict
the social harm (or his negligent or reckless disregard of the risk
of that harm).' But beyond these crystallizations in the patterns of
European and American courts, one has little guidance in determining

whether an issue is one for the prosecution or one for the defense.
Consider the issue of necessity to save the mother's life in an abortion
prosecution..7 Or the issue that faced the court in Morrison v. California:'s the fact of citizenship in a prosecution for conspiracy to put
an alien in possession of agricultural land. How does one determine
whether these issues adhere to the prosecutor's or to the defendant's
case, whether one side or the other should bear the risk of residual
doubt on the facts? Can one devise a principle for determining the
cluster of issues to be cast to the defendant's charge? It is yet to be done.
One guide to this cluster of issues is the common law concept of the
"defense." The term itself is pregnant with responsibility for the
defense. Surprisingly, it finds no counterpart in French and German
terminology for classifying substantive criminal issues. It is in this area
that common law and civilian jurisdictions express their individuality
15. A possible exception is the common law defense of alibi; that the issue is termed
a "defense" is enough to make some courts say that the defendant bears the burden of
proof on the issue. E.g., Porter v. State, 200 Ga. 246, 36 S.E.2d 794 (1946); other courts
refer to the defendant's burden of proof, yet the context makes it dear that the reference
is to the burden of going forward. Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441
(1959); State v. Withrow, 142 W.Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913, 921 (1957); cf. Halko v. State, 54
Del. 180, 175 A.2d 42 (1961) (reversing for instruction that defendant had to prove alibi to
"satisfaction" of jury).
16. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462; 1 UNDEIlLa,
CRalUNAL EvIDENcE §§ 51, 54 (5th ed. P. Herrick 1956); Patarin, supra note 5, at 25;
Geyer, supra note 14, at 212; 2 H. ZACHARIAE, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCuIEN STRI-RO1zmssFs 416 (1868). Requiring the accused to prevail on the issue of his intent to use bur.
glary tools in his possession raises constitutional problems in Germany and in the United
States. Compare United States v. Benton, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (declaring unconstitutional a provision requiring defendant "satisfactorily to account for the possession"
of an implement that "reasonably may be employed in the commission of any crime")
with Judgment of October 3, 1958, 1959 NEUE JURIs-ISCHE WOChIENCInRIr 1952 (Landge-

richt, Heidelberg) (declaring inapplicable StGB § 245a requiring persons convicted of certain offenses to prove that burglary tools found in their possession were not being held
for criminal purposes). If the accused must prove the reasonableness of a mistake of fact
as a defense, e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956), he In effect bears
the burden of persuasion on the issue of negligence. See N. MoRius & C. HoWAPD, STUDIES
IN CRIMINAL LAw

221-22 (1964).

17. Allocating the burden of persuasion on this issue has evoked considerable litiga.
tion. The courts generally hold that the state must disprove necessity beyond a reason.
able doubt. E.g., Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); State v, Bates,
52 Wash. 2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958). But cf. State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186, 37 A. 75 (1897)
(upholding a conviction on an instruction that necessity was "a matter of defense, which
the accused may establish if such be the fact").
18. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). This is one case holding the imposition of the burden of persuasion on the accused to be a violation of due process. Cf. Leland v. Oregon, 33 U.S.
790 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute requiring defendant to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
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by casting some but not other issues to the defendant's charge. Each
defense yields a different constellation of jurisdictions concurring that
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on that particular defense.
On some defenses, such as self-defense, there is a division of authority
in the common law world, and a corresponding taking of sides by
French and German jurists.19 On one significant matter, namely on
the claim of authorization to engage in regulated economic activity, the
common law courts uniformly impose the burden of persuasion on
the defendant.20 Also, uniformly, at the opposite pole, Continental
courts assign matters of authorization and license to the prosecution's
charge. 21 And there are other permutations. Until 1963, the German
courts, out of step with common law and French courts, expected
defendants to prove that the prosecution was barred by the statute of
limitations.2 2 And today in Germany, but not in France, the accused
must prove that his alleged offense is encompassed by a legislative
declaration of amnesty.23 Against this backdrop of inconsistencies, one
19. Compare cases and authorities cited note 10 supra, with Mo.
PENAL CODE
§§ 1.12(1), 1.13(9)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (burden on prosecution to disprove
claims of excuse or justification beyond a reasonable doubt); Frank v. United States, 42
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1930) (burden on prosecution to disprove self-defense be)ond a reasonable doubt); k. v. Lobell, [1957] 2 W.L.R. 524, 1 All E.R. 734 (same); W. STrEE, upra
note 3, at 19-21 and cases cited note 27 infra.
20. See p. 909 and notes 93-97 infra.
21. Though there are numerous provisions regulating the practice of the professions
and use of titles, e.g., France: Statute on Physicians and Dentists, Decree of October 5,
1953 §§ 375-380, [1953] Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franpaise 8867, CoDE PiNAL (appendix) at 499-500 (64th ed. Dalloz 1966-67); Germany: Strafgesetzbuch [SLGBI §§ 132 &
132a; the commentators do not regard the proof of license or authorization as a question
different from the proof of other elements of the prosecution's case. The German commentators assume that the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly acted without

permission. Scar'N.E-ScHRmER, STRAF.osEmucH § 132, at 725-26, comments 11 & 12
(13th ed. 1967); H. WnEz.L, DAs DEuTscHtE STAREcirr 462 (9th ed. 1965).
22. The French prosecutor must establish F'ladnent legal, which includes the punishability of the offense under the statute of limitations. Judgment of December 16, 1964,
[1965] Sem. Jur. II, No. 14086 (Cas. crim., Fr.); 2 G. VoAL & J. MACNOL, Couvs DE nomT
cRIm EL T DE sciENcE P.NrrENTARx 1022 (9th ed. 1949). The concept of llinent hgal
has no counterpart in German doctrine. Until the Judgment of February 19, 163, 18 Ent-

scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsadcen [BGHSt.] 274, die accuind in a Ger-

man court bore the burden of persuasion on the running of the statute of limitations.
For a critique of the old law, see AV. STE, supra note 3, at 64-66. Cf. the resolution of the
same question in common law courts, note 93 infra.
23. Proving the l'eliment Idgal (note 22 supra) includes proving the nonapplicability
of amnesty provisions. 2 G. SEFAms & G. LEVSEUR, PRoCbnum PiLMLE 22 (1965); Patarin,
supra note 3, at 29-30 (accord without reference to I'dlnent legaI). German courts require the accused to prove that his offense occurred during the period encompassed by
an amnesty statute. Judgment of April 22, 1921, 56 Entscheidungen des Reich-serichts in
Strafsachen [RGSt.] 49 (this is the leading case; the rationale was that an amnesty provision is an extraordinary intervention in the processes of the criminal law). The rule of
the case is endorsed in Schwartz, Das Grundgesetz in der strafrechtlichen Praxis, 1950
NEuE Jusrissce WocHFNscmuRFr 124, 125, and criticized in W. STRia, supra note 3, at
68-73 (1962).
Issues under amnesty statutes pertaining to the accused's blameworthiness are subject
to the rule in dubio pro reo. Judgment of July 6, 1954, [1954] JURscE RuNocamu 351
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could hardly argue that a single, compelling consideration explains the
departures from the policy praised in the presumption of innocence.
II. Two Kinds of Legal Rules: The Thesis Stated
The jurisdictions under study range from those like Pennsylvania
which impose on the defendant the burden of persuasion on all the
common law defenses, 24 to those like the German Federal Republic
which almost uniformly apply the principle of acquitting in cases of
doubt. 25 The swing from one end of the spectrum to the other yields
a medley of divergent positions and local idiosyncracies. To put this
contemporary jumble in context, we should cast a glance back a
hundred years or so to a period when a more uniform pattern marked
the Western legal systems. In 19th century French, German and
common law courts, the pattern-with few exceptions-was uniformly

to impose the burden of persuasion on men relying on the matters that
common lawyers call defenses to crime. On a number of issues, and
particularly on self-defense and insanity, the 19th century Western
courts demanded proof from the accused by a preponderance of the
evidence. 28 The greater diversity today is an expression of movement
toward greater protection of the innocent defendant. The movement
has proceeded at varying rates, and each jurisdiction has moved inde-

(Bundesgerichtshof, Ger.); Judgment of November 29, 1957, 1958 NEuE JURsSrtscunv Woc1t.
'NscmHFr 392 (Bundesgerichtshof, Ger.).
24. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411 (1964) (self-defense); Common.
wealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534 (1964) (insanity); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935) (intoxication); Commonwealth v. Bitzer, 163 Pa. Super.
386, 62 A.2d 108 (Super. Ct. 1948) (license to render service as a public utility).
25. The general rule is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., 1 E. SCuMiDT, supra note 8, at

206-07; W. STE, supra note 3, at 19-22. Exceptions include: (1) amnesty provlslong, note

23 supra; (2) the claims of immunity by physicians who participated in Hitler's euthanasia
program, see p. 926 infra; (3) StGB § 186 (defense of truth in prosecution for libel),
Judgment of February 12, 1958, 11 BGHSt. 273, 274; (4) StGB § 182 (defense of the female's
unchastity in prosecution for statutory rape), Judgment of April 24, 1951, 1951 NrEU
JURISTIsCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 530 (Bundesgerichtshof, Ger.). It is widely thought that In
prosecutions for receiving stolen property under StGB § 259, the statutory language requires
the accused to prove that he did not know that property was stolen. But cf. Bockelman,
Der Nachweis des Hehlervorsatzes, 1954 NEUE JUiusTiSCHE VocnENsCusarT 1745.
26. E. BONNIER, TRArrA DES PuvEs 22 (5th ed. 1888); A. VoN FrUERIACII, supra note 5,
§ 86, at 66 & § 90 (insanity), § 568, at 372 (self-defense); F. OrPrEHorF, S'Arorsrzuucit voR
DAS DEUTrSCH REICH § 51, at 140, Comment 9 (12th ed. 1891); F. WHARTON, CRIMI1NAL IviDENcE 252-69 (9th ed. 1884); H. KELLEY, CRaHiNAL LAW AND PaAarlCa 131 (1876); S. RAPALJE,
CEIMINAL PRoc-DuR. 344 (1889); see cases cited notes 60 & 92 infra. Some nineteenth
century German writers and American judges perceived a distinction between self'defense
and insanity; the latter, they said, was inconsistent with the defendant's criminal Intent;
thus one could expect the prosecution to establish the defendant's sanity beyond a reasupra note 16,
sonable doubt. J. GLAsER, LxRE voM BEwEis 90-93 (1883); 2 H. ZACHAISA,
at 416-17; Hopps v. People, 31 II. 385 (1863); People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868); State
v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224 (1861).
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pendently. Among the principal Western European jurisdictions, the
German courts of the late 19th century were the first to take steps
toward overruling the rules and doctrines requiring defendants to
produce preponderating evidence on self-defense and insanity.2- Several
decades later, the English courts began to overhaul the common law
rule, dating back to fecund remarks by Blackstone and Foster, that the
defendant must prove matters asserted in mitigation or justification of
the crime charged.28 And for the last two decades, French scholars have

been locked in a doctrinal dispute that may lead to a more pervasive
application of the principle in dubio pro reo in litigating criminal
defenses. 29 On this side of the Atlantic, the movement toward protection of the innocent defendant has been sporadic with many state
courts indifferent to trends in neighboring states. Some state courts, in
their initial confrontation with the issue in the late 19th century,
adopted burden-of-proof rules favorable to defendants relying on
the claims of self-defense and insanity3 0 Others have since overruled
earlier decisions to promote the same policy; 3 ' but others-a significant
number in all-still require the defendant to prove claims of selfdefense and insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.32 Yet despite
such diffident American states, the general trend in the Western world
is one away from adjudicating criminal status on doubt-ridden findings
of fact. The course of Western legal culture is not toward sub rosa
nullification of the values praised in the presumption of innocence, but
toward securing these values in practice.
That Western legal systems have evolved in unwitting harmony poses
a challenge for the legal analyst. How does one explain a trend that cuts
across national legal systems? Is it that the judges of the Continent and
of the common law courts are becoming more solicitous of the defense's
position in criminal cases? Or is it that some more fundamental change

27. Judgment of October 23, 1890, 21 RGSt. 131 (insanity); Judgment of November 13,

1885, 7 Rechtsprechung des Deutschen Reichsgeridlits in Strafsachen 664 (self-defense).
28. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462 (prosecution must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged killing was not accidental). On Blackstone and Foster, see p. 902 infra.
29.

Arguing in favor of defensive burdens of persuasion are 2 G. Srr.z

& G. LxAs-

185 (1957); H. Do.VnzMu DE
SEUR, supra note 10, at 21-23; A. Vrru, PRoC. uiRE Pvt ,A
VABRES, TRAITS DE DRorr CRiNuhEL -r DE L-GISLATIoN PiLALn COmr.%ARE 714 (3d ed. 1947).

Those against are Patarin, supra note 3; 2 G. VI.DL & J. MAGsOL, supra note 22, at 1035.

30. E.g., State v. McCluer, 5 Nev. 132 (1869); Territory v. Lucero, 8 N.M. 543, 46 Pac.
18 (1896).

31. E.g., People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 P.2d 127 (1889). overruling People v.
Milgate, 5 Cal. 127 (1855); State v. Malone, 327 Mo. 1217, 39 S.1%.2d 786 (1931), overruling
State v. Roberts, 294 Mo. 284, 242 S.W. 669 (1922); State v. Wilcox, 48 S.D. 289, 204 N.W.
369 (1925), overruling State v. Yokum, 11 S.D. 544, 79 N.W. 835 (1899).
32. See notes 10 and 13 supra.
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of legal policy has wrought repercussions on the burden of persuasion
in criminal cases? One might explicate a legal trend either by relating
it to underlying social attitudes or by relating it to a more pervasive
trend of the law. In this article, we shall follow the latter approach; we
shall consider the trend toward the protection of innocent defendants
as an expression of a fundamental reorientation of the criminal process.
In the course of a century, the orientation of the criminal process has
shifted from the model set by private litigation to a model focusing on
the justification for invoking criminal sanctions. In the mid-19th century, courts here and abroad viewed the problem of imperfect factfinding in criminal trials precisely as they regarded the same problem
in private legal disputes. Since that time the courts of the Western
world have come to appreciate the uniqueness of the fact-finding
process in criminal cases. The problem in criminal trials is not one of
efficiently arriving at a fair settlement of a dispute, but of determining
whether the state may justly condemn a man and deprive him of his
liberty. The problem, in short, is to justify the use of the state's
coercive powers. Concern for justifying the use of criminal sanctions is
increasing; /and that increasing concern explains the progressively more
favorable position of defendants on the risk of residual doubt at trial.
A specific theory of justification has emerged from the burden-ofpersuasion decisions of the last 100 years. That theory is that the state
may justly punish only those individuals whose violation of the law is
morally blameworthy. The focus of the principle is not on retribution
as an aim of punishment, but rather on the justification for subjecting
some individuals and not others to the sanctions and stigma of the
criminal law. The distinction is essential, since many commentators
tend to assume that the justification for punishment in general-that

is, the legitimate purpose of imposing criminal sanctions 83-is the same
as the justification for punishing any particular individual. On this
assumption, penal confinement in a particular case would be justified
by a showing that it serves the aims of rehabilitation, deterrence, or
33. Debate rages on the goals of the criminal process. See H. Hart, The Aims of the
LAw & CONTEMP. PeoB. 401 (1958); P. Ba rr, AN INquIRY INTO CStuINAL GuILT 51-59 (1963); FRE. ON AND REsPONSIBILITY 500-27 (H. Morris cd. 1961). Prop-

Criminal Law, 23

erly construed, this is a debate about the goals of the sentencing process, not about tile

standards for determining who may be justly deprived of his liberty. The rehabilitative
ideal, in particular, should be regarded neither as a justification for depriving a man
of his liberty nor as a justification for extending the period of his confinement. F. AtrN,
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JusTicE 7 (1964); Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform,
33 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 627, 638-44 (1966). On the conflict between rehabilitation and other
goals of the sentencing process, see Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Honicide: II, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 1261, 1318-25 (1937).
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retribution. This assumption has been rejected by contemporary legal
philosophers, who focus on the problem of justice in determining the
distribution as well as the goals of criminal sanctions. 3. And far in
advance of philosophic thought, the assumption was abandoned by the
German courts and some common law courts when they turned to
blameworthiness as the central inquiry in controversies concerning the
prosecutor's duties of persuasion.
Judicial and scholarly concern for moral blameworthiness as a necessary condition for criminal sanctions is expressed in a number of ways.
Nothing turns on the word "blameworthiness." One could as well speak
of moral fault, culpability, moral guilt, personal guilt, or, simply, guilt.
The word "guilt" is more frequently used by the courts; the words
"blameworthiness" and "culpability" are used here to avoid an ambiguity in the word "guilt" that will become apparent later. All these
words express the same concern, namely whether the defendant's violation of a proscription of the criminal law renders him properly subject
to moral censure.a The relevance of that inquiry is obvious if the

34. Two caveats on blameworthiness:
A) To refer to blameworthiness as a necessary condition of liability is not to Ray the

purpose or a purpose of the sentencing process is retribution. Unhappily, many authors
regard a concern for blameworthiness in setting standards for liability as indicative of
a retributive philosophy of punishment. H. SiLviNG, Tim CoarnsruENr

wraErs oF

CRIAm 12 (1967); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 337-39 (1966). Obviously, one can hold
the view that blameworthiness is a necessary condition for individual susceptibility to
penal confinement without thereby becoming committed to the view that punishment is
self-justifying, i.e., that penal confinement is just regardless of its social utility. See Ravrls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
B) One must distinguish between (1) the blameworthiness of doing a morally bad
act, and (2) the blameworthiness of acting contrary to law. There is obviously a category
of offenses, like traffic and possessory offenses, in which the act need not be morally bad,
e.g., one might possess a counterfeit die in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 488, without intending
to use it for fraudulent purposes. Though the act would be morally neutral, the actor
would be blameworthy if he knowingly violated the legal prohibition, or if he was culpably ignorant of the prohibition. This might not be true if the law is an unjust law.
H. L. A. Hart has challenged the view that moral culpability is a fundamental requirement of criminal liability. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DErau :iwMs AND
FREEDo m THEAGE OF MODEMN SCIENCE 101-05 (S. Hook ed. 1958). But Hart's challenge
is directed solely to Jerome Hall's claim, J. HALL, PracnxLEs oF CwLwvAL LAW 16i/67
(1947), that blameworthiness in the first sense-committing an act that is morally wrong
-is a fundamental requirement of criminal liability.
35. While courts speak of blameworthiness, scholars speak of dangerousness as the
rationale for selecting some men and not others for the criminal process. See, e.g., Michael
& Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 CoLUss. L. RaL. 701, 757-61 (1937).
The tvo standards are not so far apart as they seem; the same criteria-an intentional
violation, negligent disregard of the risk of harm-yield both judgments. Yet dangerous.
ness cannot account for insanity, intoxication, and necessity as defenses to criminal conduct. In these cases, the actor is not blameworthy, but he might be dangerous, e.g., a
man who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family would steal again if his family
should continue to starve. Michael and -Vechsler could account for these defenses by
saying that it is impossible to deter insane, intoxicated, and necessitated behavior. Id.
783-57. On the difficulties of this argument see note 86 infra.
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purpose of punishment is retribution; it is less obvious, but equally
relevant if, with Bentham, one takes the view that the purpose of
punishment should be the general deterrence of criminal conduct. Men

may not be sacrificed arbitrarily for the social good; there must be
some reasons for selecting some and not others. It is the practice today

to single out only those men who have violated the law and done so
culpably; the best apparent reason for so fashioning a deterrent system
of criminal sanctions is that this core of men-those who have violated
the law and done so culpably-have the least standing to object to being

imprisoned for the sake of the common good. If anyone should be

subjected to the criminal process, it should be they. 0 Any extension of

the criminal law beyond this core of blameworthy men poses problems
of discriminatory treatment. To treat two men alike, one who has

caused harm culpably and the other who has done so without culpability, is to ignore a morally significant distinction between them. Thus,
from the point of view of general deterrence as the aim of the criminal

law, the postulate that only the blameworthy should suffer under the
criminal law becomes a standard for fairly and equally distributing the
burdens of criminal sanctions.

The concern for justifying the use of criminal sanctions, then,
explains the progressively more favorable position of criminal defendants with respect to the burden of persuasion. This is a significant
claim for several reasons. First, it provides an account of the trend of

Continental and Anglo-American case law on the burden of persuasion
that transcends the procedural and institutional differences between
36. The faith dies hard that the purpose of general deterrence can account for the
excusing conditions now recognized in the criminal law. Michael & Wechsler, sulnra note
35, at 736 (self-defense); Katz & Goldstein, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'.--Why Not?,
72 YALE L.J. 853, 856-57 (1963) (self-defense). The implicit premise of this view is that
the purpose of deterrence entails the impropriety of punishing those whose behavior Is
non-deterrable. The argument was made by Bentham. J. BENTHAM, PUNCIPLES OF AO3tAL9
AND LEGISLATION 173 (1907). H. L, A. Hart has called this alle ed entailment it "spectacu.
lar non-sequitur." H. L. A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishnent, 60
PROC, AmusomL.AN Soc. 1, 18 (n.s. 1959). The fallacy lies in assuming that punishment
of someone who acted in self-defense would not be effective in deterring homiclide in
general.
H. L. A. Hart's major contribution to the theory of punishment is his distinction be,
tween the general justifying aim of sanctions and the principle of distribution of sane.
tions. Id. 8-12. Hart, however, shuns blameworthiness as a rationale for the distribution
of penal confinement, i.e., for determining who may be justly deprived of his liberty.
Cf. his dispute with Jerome Hall, discussed in note 34 supra. Hart focuses on the maxim
that the state may justly punish only those who have voluntarily violated the laiv. id,
20-23. This maxim, and the argument he offers on its behalf, raise new questions on the
justice of punishing negligent conduct. Wasserstrom, H. L. A. Hart and the Doctrines of
"Mens Rea" and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. Cal. L. REV. 92, 102-04 (1967), Hart
assumes, improperly, that one can determine whether duress or insanity renders conduct
involuntary without asking the more basic question whether the actor is to blame for
his conduct. At least one distinguished Writer fails to acknowledge the issue of justice
in determining which men should suffer a loss of liberty in the Interests of social control,
B. WooTroN, CQmE AND THE CIUMINAL LAW 32-57 (1963),
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the two systems.37 And secondly, it provides a perspective for assessing

the widespread view that moral fault is a factor of declining moment
in the evolution of Anglo-American criminal law. The view that moral
fault is of declining relevance in the criminal law trades heavily on the

role of strict liability offenses in common law jurisdictions.3S True,
public welfare violations, entailing monetary sanctions, may be with us
to stay.39 And the courts have sentenced men to be jailed, without a

finding of fault, for committing the crimes of bigamy, statutory rape and
selling opium. 40 But that is not enough to show that a general decline
of moral culpability as a necessary condition for punishment has
accompanied the rise of general deterrence and fall of retribution as
87. Continental writers explain the common law practice of defensive burdens of persuasion as an expression of the adversary system. A. GEyER, LEimiuucit DEs SrnAmrozassRxcRTHs 710-11 (1880); G. ViDAL & J. MA.NoL, supra note 22, at 1035 n2. There is no

correlation, however, between the type of trial-inquisitorial or adversarial-and the
presence or absence of defensive burdens. The Prussian Criminal Ordinance of 1805 had
several provisions imposing the burden of persuasion on the accused, yet it regulated
an inquisitorial system. See pp. 899.900 & notes 58-59 infra; Kilssner, Ober Bceceislast
and Presumtionen im Preussischen Strafverfahrrn, 3 GOLTD. mEma'S Anciuv rm PEUSiscrHEs STRUAmcaT 82-34 (1855). Also, the difference between French and German develop-

ment on the burden of persuasion does not seem to be traceable to differences in the
trial roles of the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. See generally Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France:An Introductory Analysis, 23 Ls. L. REv. 1. 21-28
(1962); Jescheck, Germany, in TnE AccusED: A ComPARAmTE Svutv 246.47 (J. Coutts cd.
1966).
38. Cf. -. FRiED.AN, LAw IN A CHANGING SoCiTY 167-71 (1964); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L, REY, 55, 67-70 (1933). Writers opposed to strict liability offenses frequently rest their case on the inefficacy rather than the Injustice of punishing
the blameless offender. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)
("In the absence of minimal culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective
nor an incapacitative function to perform.'). Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 Surpa.mm COURT REv. 107, 109 ("[Punishment] is inefficacious because conduct
unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors making it criminal does not mark the
actor as one who needs to be subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others
from behaving similarly in the future, . . .'). However fallacious these arguments might
be, see note 36 supra, they do serve to suppress value judgments on the Injustice of
punishing blameless men and thus they appeal to men who regard questions of utility
as more objective than questions of morality.
89. The term stems from Sayre, supra note 38, who distinguishes betveen public wclfare and traditional offenses primarily on the ground that the former entailed penalties
less severe than imprisonment. Id. 72. The Model Penal Code distinguishes beween
crimes and violations; strict liability standards apply only in the latter category, vhere
the maximum penalty is a fine. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Some writers have criticized strict liability standards even as a basis for imposing fines.
J, HALL, GENERAL PR icrs oF CAmnNAL LAW 342-51 (2d ed. 1960); G. WIu'ts, CnvtieAL LAw § 89 (2d ed. 1961). Strict liability offenses may be regarded as offenses in which
the legislature has determined that the occurrence of the proscribed event Is conclusive
on the issue of blameworthiness. See Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law,
12 STAN. L. Rnv. 781, 743 (1960). The problem, of course, is whether the legislature can
constitutionally so intrude on the fact-finding function of the judiciary. Sce generally
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill
of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 30 (1962).
40. E.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (indictment need not allege, and
state need not prove knowledge that item sold was opium); State v. Goonan. 89 N.H.
p28, 8 A.2d 105 (1938) (bigamy); State v. Duncan, 82 Mont. 170, 266 P. 400 (1928) (statutory rape). For additional cases on these and other offenses, see MODEL PZENAL CODE § 2.05,
Comment, at 141-45 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Sayre, supra note 88, at 84-88.
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the moving force of the criminal law. Viewed in broad perspective, the
use of strict liability standards in serious offenses may appear as but a
passing aberration of the criminal law. As a contribution to a broader
perspective on trends in the common law, we shall consider the role
of moral culpability in allocating the burden of persuasion over the
last hundred years. The ascendency of moral guilt as a central factor
in these decisions at least casts doubt on the view that moral considerations are on the wane in administering the criminal law.
The appropriate vehicle for studying the reorientation of the criminal process is the form of legal rule generated by the two competing
models of the process. Each of these models-that patterned after private
litigation and that focusing on the justification for using sanctions--has
cast the rules of criminal liability into a characteristic form.
Oriented as they were toward private litigation, courts in the 19th
century regarded rules of criminal liability as functional analogues to
rules for settling private disputes. Characteristically, rules of private
law are incomplete statements of the relevant substantive issues. They
are rules that admit of exceptions. For example, one acquires a private
legal duty to perform services if one has agreed for a fee to do so. The
rule is well formed-it provides a theory of recovery-even though it
fails to suggest the impact of impossibility of performance in determining the promisor's liability. Impossibility is a defense, an exception

to the rule of liability. Similarly it is a well-formed rule of private law
that a man is liable for harm that he negligently and proximately
causes. This rule too admits of exceptions; if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent or if he assumed the risk, the rule is inapplicable.
In contrast, the emergent rules of criminal liability are rules that do
not admit of exceptions. Unlike rules of private law, they encompass
all relevant substantive issues; their function is to enumerate the
necessary and sufficient substantive conditions for the justified use of
criminal sanctions. When applied at trial, they generate only one
question: are the conditions of criminal guilt satisfied? Defensive issues,
like self-defense and insanity, are raised not as exceptions, but as denials
of liability under the rule. These characteristics of the emergent rules
of criminal liability suggest the term "comprehensive rules" to distinguish them from the incompletely stated rules customarily used in
private litigation.
The difference between rules subject to exceptions and comprehensive rules is reflected in the structures they impose on the issues
relevant to criminal liability. If rules of liability must be supplemented
by exceptions, the concept of liability they express is unavoidably
dualistic: some issues comprise the rules and other issues constitute
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exceptions. Comprehensive rules, on the other hand, impose a unified
structure on the issues related to the blameworthiness of the defendant's
conduct. The virtue of this unified structure is that all substantive
issues thus encompassed, be they affirmative or negative in form, be
they inculpatory or exculpatory in effect, play the same functional role

in determining the defendant's liability for crime. This functional

parity derives from the one factor unifying the issues so structured:
they all relate to the defendant's moral guilt in acting contrary to law.
Comprehensive rules of liability emerged in their most systematic
form as a by-product of advances in German criminal theory in the late
19th century. Their crystallization was a consequence of scholarly
concern for the structuring and categorization of the issues pertaining
to criminal liability. As a parallel development to their emergence, the
German criminal courts extended the principle of in dubio pro reo
to all substantive issues bearing on criminal guilt. Thus, a full account
of comprehensive rules and their bearing on the patterns of the case law
must await our examination of these German developments at the turn
of the century.
The parallel movement toward comprehensive rules of liability and
toward acquitting criminal defendants in cases of doubt as to any
substantive issue is less compelling as one turns to French and common
law practices; for in these jurisdictions, the courts generally still
require the defendant to prove one or more of the common defenses,
e.g., self-defense, insanity, license. Without a total shift in practice, one
can hardly say the courts have adopted a new vision of rules of criminal
liability. The most we can claim is that the pattern of French and
common law decisions has moved toward the unified structure achieved
by the German courts.
But this is getting ahead of the story. To provide an historical context

for a study of comprehensive rules of liability, we need initially to
document the pattern dominant in the 19th century and before, namely
the pattern of assimilating burden-of-proof disputes in criminal cases
to the model set by private litigation. We may then turn to the radical
change in German practice at the close of the 19th century. To round
out the comparative study, we shall consider the nascent patterns of
change in French, English, and American courts. Finally, we shall consider some of the difficulties of applying comprehensive rules and, at
the conclusion of our investigation, we shall explore in greater detail
the philosophy underlying the view of the criminal law as a system of
comprehensive rules expressing the necessary and sufficient conditions
for justifying the use of criminal sanctions.
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III. The Private Law Style
In the mid-19th century, in common law as well as in Continental
courts, defendants almost uniformly bore the burden of persuasion on
the array of issues common lawyers called defenses. Criminal defendants
were subjected to a greater risk of conviction on issues such as selfdefense and duress than on the supposedly more central questions of
criminal liability such as the fact that the crime was committed.
Common law courts persisted in this practice even though they had come
to speak both of a presumption of innocence and of the especially
stringent burden of persuasion borne by the prosecution in criminal
cases; proof beyond a reasonable doubt was the emerging standardbut only on the issues of the prosecution's case. That the judges could
stiffen the burden of persuasion on some issues but not on others was a
consequence of their view of rules of criminal liability as indistinguishable from rules governing private disputes.
To document and evaluate the impact of the private-law style of
thinking in the criminal process, we shall turn first to an examination
of judicial practices on the burden of persuasion in private cases, After
delineating the style and function of rule formulation and burden-ofpersuasion allocations in adjudicating private disputes, we shall be in
a position to analyze and to assess the influence of private law modes of
thinking on the allocation of the burden of persuasion in criminal cases.
A. Allocating the Burden of Persuasionin PrivateLegal Disputes
By allocating the burden of persuasion in private cases, courts generate a set of stop-gap rules for adjudicating imperfectly clarified disputes.

These stop-gap rules measurably modify the substantive rules of the
dispute. If the defendant must prove contributory negligence, he loses
much of the tactical value promised by that defense. If the debtor must
prove an alleged payment of the debt, he is that much at a disadvantage.
On these issues and others, Western courts and legislatures have imposed
the burden of persuasion with a watchful eye to policy demands. The
burden of persuasion has proved to be a subtle, low-visibility tool for
adjusting the interests of competing classes of litigants. Yet on the
run-of-the-mill issues in private litigation, the calls of policy are weak
and of many voices. Our sense of justice helps us little in allocating the
burden of persuasion on the issue of consent in cases of battery, yet
the decision must be made in this kind of case as well as on issues at
the forefront of the law's evolution.
Frequently reluctant to sort out the policy demands, Western jurists
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have instead elaborated and relied upon an historically prestigious,
seemingly logical guideline for allocating the burden of persuasion. As
developed by the Romans, the logical standard is: ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit; non qui negat.41A corollary maxim provides a more straightforward rationale when the burden of persuasion is imposed upon the
defendant: reus excipiendo fit actor.4
Underlying these maxims is the assumption that legal issues follow
a well-defined logical pattern. Expressed in the maxims from two different perspectives, the pattern is one of rule to exception. Relying upon
a rule, a party comes forth as the proponent of the issue, and
accordingly he must bear the burden of persuasion. In response to the
asserted rule, the opposing party may do one of two things: he may
challenge the facts rendering the rule applicable, or he may go outside
the rule and argue that despite the rule's factual applicability an
additional consideration avoids the rule's legal impact. Thus, if a plaintiff asserts that a debt is due and unpaid, the defendant may either
challenge the existence of the debt or he may argue that despite the
debt he is not liable-say, by reason of the statute of limitations. On
the former move, the defendant retains the posture of challenging the
factual applicability of the rule requiring debtors to pay their debts;
as an opponent to the rule, he benefits from the plaintiff's bearing the
burden of persuasion. On the alternative move, the defendant interposes an exception, namely the statute of limitations, to the rule of

liability for one's debts. By bringing forth a reason for not applying the
rule, he assumes the mantle of the proponent. By the logic of the
Roman maxims, he must then persuade the trier-of-fact of the facts
supporting this exception.
This logical scheme for relating issues as rules and exceptions confronts an immediate difficulty: how does one know whether a specific
issue is part of the rule or an exception to the rule? If the rule on the
statute of limitations were to read, "debtors must pay all debts enforceable under the statute of limitations," the defendant who asserted the
applicability of the statute would be merely denying one fact necessary
for applying the rule; by denying that the claim was "enforceable under
the statute," he would have the posture of an opponent to the rule's
factual applicability and would enjoy the better position on the burden
of persuasion. By changing the wording of the rule, one can translate
the statute of limitations from an exception into a premise for applying
41.

PAUL, LIDB.LXIX AD Encrusm; JusINIAN, DIGEsT 22.3.2.

42.

ULPIAN, LiB. IV AD EwIcruM; JuS-rnwiA,

DIGEsT 44.1.1.
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the rule. To overcome this difficulty, one must have recourse to an
authoritative formulation of the applicable legal rule. Only if the
formulation of a rule is given can one specify whether an issue is an
exception to the rule, rather than a premise for the rule's application.
The individuality of legal systems is expressed in their quest for
authoritative formulations of the rules of liability. Civilian judges,
working with law codified at its core, express the spirit of their system
by relying on applicable code provisions to formulate issues. German
scholars, for example, have worked out an elaborate scheme for determining whether according to the Code an issue is an element of the
rule or an exception to it. If the issue appears in a subordinate clause
introduced by phrases like "unless" or "so far as . . . not," the
German courts will treat the issue as an exception to the rule of the
main clause. 43 But not all issues appearing in subordinate clauses are
treated as exceptions. The syntactical analysis is often refined: it is of
controlling importance, for example, whether the word "not" appears
at-the beginning or near the end of the subordinate clause. 44 This
casuistic reliance on the wording of the Code might be justified as a
quest for legislative intent; but some German scholars doubt whether
ascribing so much syntactical sensitivity to the drafters of the Code is
warranted by the history of the drafting.45 Warranted by history or not,
the enthroned syntax of the German Civil Code does permit an authoritative classification of issues as elements or as exceptions to rules of
decision.46
In contrast to the approach of the civilians, common law jurists have
sought to classify issues by interweaving the task of allocating the
burden of persuasion at trial with the task of allocating the burden of

43. L. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 126-31; 1 ENNECCERus-NIPPEDEY, ALLOEMEINEni TElL
DES BURGERLCHEN RECHTS § 56, at 333 (15th ed. 1959).

44. If the "nicht" appears at the beginning of a subordinate clause, the clause Is
read as a negative premise of the plaintiff's claim, e.g., Birgerliches Gesetzbuch [BG]31
§ 477 (1); if it appears near the end, the clause is read as an exception, e.g., § 151. 1
ENNECCERuS-NiPPE 1EY, supra note 43, at 333; cf. the use of similar techniques by AngloAmerican courts in determining the difference between the enacting clause and the provisos to statutory definitions of criminal offenses, note 94 infra.
45. 1 B. WiNDSCHEm, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEXTENRECHTS 630 (9th ed. T. Kipp 1906).
46. Unlike the German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, the French Code Civil contains a
general provision on the allocation of the burden of persuasion: C. Civ. § 1315 (lie who
asserts a duty or obligation must prove it; lie who claims that a duty or obligation is
extinguished must show it). In applying this provision and in allocating the burden
of persuasion on other issues, French jurists seem not to have cultivated syntactical
analysis as much as have German scholars. E.g., IV RL-PERTOIRE DE DRorr CIVIL (ENCYCLO-

pEmn DALLOZ) (1954) Preuve, Comments 91-93, at 109. On the impact of presumptions
on the burden of persuasion in Germany and France, see L. ROSENBERG, supra note 8,
198-225; R. DECOTrIGNIES, LES PRLSOMPTIONS EN DROIT r'RIAv(1950).
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pleading prior to trial.4 7 The structured common law system of pleading, with its rigid paths, was admirably suited to distinguishing rules
from exceptions, denials from avoidance; to raise an issue in defense, the
defendant had to choose either a plea in denial (general denial or
specific traverse) or one of confession and avoidance. 8 On the former
plea, he was the opponent on the facts; on the latter, he appeared as
the proponent of a new issue-an exception to the rule advanced by
the plaintiff. To administer this system of rigid defensive tracks, the
common law courts were required to dassify defensive issues as factual
challenges or as exceptions to rules. Thus they had a basis for applying
the Roman maxim that the proponent of an issue must prove it. Consider, for example, the 19th-century English case of Christophersonv.
Bare,4 9 where the plaintiff, suing in trespass for assault and battery, challenged the defendant's attempt to raise the issue of consent under a
general denial to the declaration. On the theory that the concept of assault implied nonconsent, the court decided that consent could be
argued as a factual denial of the allegation of assault and battery. With
the classification of nonconsent as a premise for the plaintiff's case, the
Roman principles find a foothold. The plaintiff must prove nonconsent,
for it is part of the rule under which he seeks to recover. Relying on
decisions structuring the system of pleading, courts could readily apply
the Roman principle for allocating the burden of persuasion-even
though a classification made for the purposes of pleading might lead to

unwanted results on the burden of persuasion. Nonetheless, the intermingling of the two categories of decision facilitated the search for an
authoritative classification of issues. As German scholars found an
arbiter of burden-of-persuasion decisions in the syntax of their civil
code, common law jurists found parallel answers by gearing the burden
of persuasion to decisions on the relative scope of the defensive pleas.
Decisions on pleading at common law may often have been made
with an eye to the implications for the burden of persuasion, but this
was not always the case. The system occasionally produced pleading
rules at odds with the judiciary's preferences on the burden of persuasion. The notable example is the issue of payment in an action on a
47. Nineteenth century writers uncritically accepted the principle that the burden of
persuasion should depend on the burden of pleading. T. SrARm, EvmN
534 (9th ed.
1869); J. S-IEN, DwEsr oF THm LAw OF EvmEdcE, Art. 93, at 152 (4th ed. 1877); J.

McKELyvr, EVDENcE (1898). Contemporary writers find little value in the interweaing
of the two burdens; the policy problems, they submit, are merely shifted from one area
to another. F. JAms, CivirL PROCEDURE 256 (1965); C. CLArK, CODE P.AD L'G 610 (2d ed.
1947).
48. C. CLARK, supra note 47, at 575-76.
49.

11 Q.B. 473, 116 Eng. Rep. 554 (1848).

897

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 77: 880, 1968

note. The allegation of nonpayment is required in the complaint;
otherwise, it is said, the complaint would lack a well-defined theory of
recovery. 0 Having reached this conclusion, the common law judiciary
balked at the implication: that the creditor would have to prove nonpayment. To avoid this result and others, the courts developed a
number of ad hoc devices to check the influence of pleading rules on
the burden of persuasion. To spare the creditor from his burden, the
courts argued the unfairness and inconvenience of expecting a party
to prove a negative proposition; 1 admittedly, it is easier for the debtor
to provide proof of payment-a single incident-than for the creditor
to exhaust a wide variety of circumstances under which the defendant
might have made 'payment. But the persuasiveness of the argument
that one cannot prove a negative proposition is unpredictable: it does
not alleviate the plaintiff's burden to prove nonconsent in a battery
case; 52 nor does it excuse the obligee from proving nonperformance in
other contract actions. Another argument used to adjust the burden of
persuasion is that the facts are "particularly within the knowledge" of
one of the parties.54 This argument also prevails only sporadically."
The unpredictability of the arguments used to counteract the influence
of pleading rules has led common law scholars to despair of a coherent
theory to explain the system's burden-of-persuasion practices.50
This survey of the burden of persuasion in civilian and common law
jurisdictions has sought to pinpoint the characteristic moves made by
Western jurists in justifying allocations of the burden of persuasion in
private cases. The starting place for analysis in both systems is the
Roman principle that the proponent of an issue bears the burden of
persuasion on the factual premises for applying the rule. One product
of this classification is the differentiation in both systems between issues
comprising the plaintiff's prima facie case for recovery and issues, called
defenses or privileges, enabling the defendant to prevail even though
the plaintiff proves his prima facie case. The two families of legal sys50. See Alden, The Defense of Payment under Code Procedure, 19 YALE L.J. 647
(1910) ("[rJhe making of the contract does not of itself give rise to a right of actlon.').
On the need to allege nonpayment in a code complaint, see cases cited, C. CLWA:, supra
note 47, at 286, nn. 30-31.
51. Edmonds v. Edmonds, 1 Ala. (ns.) 401, 402 (1840); 2 B. JoNES, EviDENCE 882-83
(2d ed. J. Henderson 1926).
52. Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15 (1940).
53. 9 J. WIGMCRE, EVIDENcE § 2486, at 274 (8d ed. 1940).
54. Id. 275; C. McCosunncK, EVmENCE § 318, at 675 (1954) (stressing that relative access
to evidence should at most affect the burden of going forward).
55. F,JAMES, Cnvi PRODEDIURE 257 (1965); 9 J. WIGIOE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (Sd
ed. 1940).

56. See F. JA ms, CxVIi

PROcEDURE

255 (1965); C. McCoRMxc, EvMFDcN

9 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENCE § 2486, at 278 (3d ed. 1940).
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tems diverge in their techniques for classifying rules and exceptionsfor separating the prima facie case from the defenses. Civilians rely
primarily on the syntax of code provisions; common law jurists, primarily on decisions made in administering the pleading system. And,
as we have noted, common law practice frequently deviates from the
Roman principles on the strength of ad hoc arguments of convenience
and fairness.
With this account of the function and style of burden-of-persuasion
decisions in private cases, we may turn to some applications of our
observations. The first point for documentation is that the private law
style dominates the opinions of those courts, both here and abroad, that
have demanded proof of criminal defenses by a preponderance of the
evidence.

B. The Burden of Persuasion in Criminal Cases: The Impact of the
Private Law Style
At the midpoint of the 19th century, the run of Western courts and
scholars spoke of the burden of persuasion in criminal cases in an idiom
borrowed from private litigation. They conceived of the criminal
process as a dispute divisible into two kinds of issues: those belonging
to the prosecution's case and those belonging to the defendant's case,
each party bearing the duty to persuade on the issues of his case. To

classify issues on one side or the other, the courts drew on the Roman
principle that the defendant must prove exceptions to the rules of
liability. Following this system, European and American courts were
virtually of one mind that self-defense and insanity were issues on
which the defendant bore the burden of persuasion.
The mid-19th century developments on the Continent centered
around the contributions of three authors: two leading German criminalists, Mittermaier and Feuerbach, and the influential French scholar,
Bonnier. Feuerbach, one of the highly-regarded German legal scholars
of the modern era, fully embraced the division of criminal disputes
into two kinds of issues, issues for the state and issues for the defense.
As Feuerbach delineated the two categories of issues, der Anschuldigungsbeweis (the inculpatory case) included all issues that led to a conviction according to the criminal code, and der Entsczuldigungsbeweis
(the exculpatory case) included all issues that prevented the imposition
of a criminal sanction.5 7 This bifurcation of the criminal case bears
57. A. voN Fku~mucH. supra note 5, § 568, at 372, & § 570, at 378.
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the imprint of the Roman principle that the defendant must prove
exceptions to rules of liability: the inculpatory case is the rule laid down
by the criminal code; the exculpatory case, the exceptions avoiding
application of the sanction.i s
Feuerbach's account of German criminal procedure found ample
support in the midcentury legislation of the independent German
states. The Prussian Criminal Ordinance of 1805 is illustrative. Section
367 of the Ordinance provides that "one having the proof of the act
against him is subject to the statutory punishment unless he proves that
under the circumstances the act was not an offense." Also, to round out
the parallel with the allocation of the burden of persuasion in private
cases, Section 363 provides that the burden of persuasion falls on him
who stands to gain from the proof of an issue, in short, on the proponent of the issue.59 Under these principles, the judges of the time
readily reached the conclusion that the defendant had the burden to
exculpate himself on a wide array of issues, including self-defense and
insanity.60
Though Feuerbach and Mittermaier agreed that criminal disputes
reduced to an inculpatory case for the state and an exculpatory case
for the defense, they introduced a germ of discontent with the ap.
proach of the time. Conceding that the state had to prove the issues
of its case to the point of certainty, they were reluctant to conclude
that the defendant had to make out his case by the same degree of
proof. But Continental private law knew no intermediary, objective
standards of evidence like the common law's "preponderance of the
evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence." There was no customary middle ground; the duty to prove meant the duty to persuade to the
58. The concepts of Anschuldigungsbeweis and Entschuldigungsbeweis were used by
virtually all mid-nineteenth century writers. See Kiissner, supra note 87, at 35. H.
ZAC4AItAE, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFn'ROC'SES 416-17 (1868); J. GLASER, Lrim
vot BEwYs 85 (1883).
59. These sections are discussed in Kilssner, supra note 37, at 3ff. The Preussische
Criminalordnungwas enacted on December 11, 1805; its roots are in the Carollni constitutio criminalis of 1532, which also required the accused to persuade on defensive
issues (e.g., § 141: self-defense). A. SCHOETNsAclH, DER STRArRozSs DER CAROLINA 78-81

(1904).

60. On self-defense and insanity, see authorities cited note 26 supra. Two cases front
the mid-nineteenth century illustrate the dominant techniques for allocating the burden
of persuasion on borderline issues. In its judgment of November 4, 1853, the Prussian
High Court reversed an acquittal of one E who was charged with statutory rape of a girl
under the age of 14; the trial court had instructed the jury that it was up to the prosecution to prove that E knew the age of the girl; the High Court held that mistake of
age was a defense, to be proven by the accused. [1854] Justiz-Ministerial-Blatt ffir die
Preussishe Gesetzgebung 5. The High Court reached the same conclusion on the defense
of mistake of fact to a charge of assisting an illegal immigrant. Judgment of November

30,

1853, 2 GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FuR PREusstscHEs STRAFREcHT 255
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point of certainty.0' To avoid the rigors of treating defensive criminal
issues like defensive issues at private law, Feuerbach argued that the
criminal defendant should prevail even if his proof is incomplete; it
would suffice if he supported his exculpatory claim with a showing of
62
probability.
Mittermaier came to the same conclusion, and in the process formulated an argument that was to have lasting influence in Continental
criminal law. To mitigate the defensive burden that prevailed in
private cases, Mittermaier challenged the applicability of the private
law concept of "defense" (Einrede)in criminal theory. "The claim of
self-defense," he argued, "is not to be treated as a defense (Einrede)but
rather as a denial that the killing is a criminal act."0 For the time, it
was a remarkable claim-one that Mittermaier himself did not rigorously pursue; for if the daim of self-defense was merely a denial, and
not an exception to the rule of liability, why should one expect even
a showing of probability to support it? The state should bear the full
risk of nonpersuasion as it does in other inculpatory issues contestable
by the defendant's denial. Mittermaier was content to reduce the defendant's burden to providing a showing of probability. Nonetheless, his
questioning of the place of the private law concept of "defense" in
criminal cases was an insight that signaled the declining influence of
private-law modes of thinking in criminal cases.
The translation of Mittermaier's treatise into French enhanced his
influence abroad. Bonnier studied the treatise and relied on it in
formulating his critique of the French law of evidence." Following
Feuerbach and Mittermaier, he accepted the basic applicability of the
Roman principle that the defendant must prove exceptions to the rules
of criminal liability;6 5 and like his German predecessors, he contended
that something less than full proof of the defensive issues should suffice.
As he put it: la probabilitedu fait allegue doit sufire pour motiver son
[i.e., the defendant's] acquittement.60 Even the standard used-that of
probability, a standard as uncommon in French as in German lawmirrors the influence of Mittermaier's treatise.
61. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules Under
the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof' in The Germarn
Code of CriminalProcedure, 16 BuFF. L RLv. 122, 146 (1966).
62. A. VON FEUERBACH, supra note 57, § 571, at 374.
63. 2 C. MArrrTmuR, DAs DEUtSCHM SR,aVRFAXR
N 365 (4th ed. 1845.46); Cf. J.

GLAsnz, LEBRu vot BEIVs 90 (1883) (accepting concept of Einredc as applicable in
criminal cases).

64. BoN mp, TRAfr Drs PREuvES 22 (5th ed. 1888).
65. Id. 20-29. 80.
66. Id. 22; cf. id. 80 ("un grave degrd de probabilit4d" required to support a defensive

claim).
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As Mittermaier and Feuerbach lent their scholarly seal to trends in
Continental law, Foster and Blackstone did the same for the common
law. And though the two systems evolved independently, their initial
posture was the same. A century prior to Mittermaier's writing, Sir
Michael Foster formulated a view of homicide legislation entailing the
classification of issues as those of inculpation and those of exculpation,
as matters for the prosecution and as matters for the defense. With
minor revision, Foster's formulation became the law according to
Blackstone and, in time, it became the unquestioned practice of the
English courts. Foster and Blackstone articulated split rules of criminal

liability by assigning specific issues to the defendant's case. According
to Foster, the prisoner had "satisfactorily" to prove circumstances of
"accident, necessity and infirmity."6 7 And according to Blackstone, the
defense's case included "circumstances of justification, excuse and
alleviation." 68 Neither author offered a convincing account for his view
of the law. Both relied on a single argument: that the law presumes all
killings to be malicious "until the contrary appeareth upon evidence." 00
And together they could muster only a single case as authority for their
70
reading of the common law: The King v. Oneby.
Oneby's Case came before the judges of the King's Bench on a special
verdict stipulating that the defendant had killed a man in a fight over
a game of cards. The facts stipulated in the verdict did not admit of
the construction that Oneby killed under provocation. Nor did the
verdict, specifying as it did that the defendant and his victim were
alone when the stabbing occurred, support the conclusion that Oneby
killed maliciously, i.e., unprovoked by a sudden quarrel. That the verdict was silent on the issue worked to the defendant's detriment; the
judges found him guilty of murder. Their rationale was straightforward: "[i] f A kills B and no sudden quarrel appears, it is murder; for
it lies on the party indicted to prove the sudden quarrel.""
Foster, with Blackstone following suit, took the Oneby ruling to
67. M. FOSrER, CROWN LAw 255 (1762).
68. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201.
69. The presumption of malice derives from the phrase in MacKally's Case, 9 Co.
Rep. 65b, 77 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B. 1611), that "the law implies malice" in cases of killing
without provocation. Id. at 67b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 833. The doctrine of implied malice
enabled prosecutors to convict of murder on a showing of an intentional killing alone,
see p. 905 infra. Hale changed the phrase to "the law presumes it to be malicious,"
1 HAtE, PLws OF TmE CROWN 455 (1694); and that is basically the form that appears In

M. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 255 (1762). Blackstone, however, changed the expression to "all

homicide is presumed to be malicious," and thus

coined a presumption of malice that

appeared much more to be a presumption of fact. 4

BLACRSTONE,

70. 2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1727).
71. Id. at 1497, 92 Eng. Rep. at 473.
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stand for the general principle that a criminal defendant should bear
the duty of persuasion on all issues that appear to be "defensive." This
is the principle that came to dominate the thinking of English courts
and of most American courts until the end of the 19th century; and
it continues, though muted and qualified, to shape the decisions in a
number of common law courts. Unhesitatingly, the English courts
applied the Blackstonian reading of the common law in cases of selfdefense72 and insanity.7 3 It was not until 1985 in the renowned Woolmington case7 4 that the English courts considered the rule afresh; and
in that case the prosecution asserted the applicability of Blackstone's
rule to the defense of accident in a homicide case-a defense on which
no defendant in a major Western court of modern times had borne the
burden of persuasion. Rejecting this extreme application of Blackstone's analysis, the House of Lords in its Woolmington decision took
the first step toward a new policy of protecting criminal defendants in
cases of doubt on "exculpatory" issues.75

The Blackstonian model of rules of criminal liability began its mard
on American courts in 1845, when Chief Justice Shaw, writing for the
Massachusetts' highest court in Commonwealth v. York,"0 devised a
rationale for requiring instruction to the jury that the defendant must
prove the defense of provocation by a preponderance of the evidence.
With the painstaking care of a vineyardist, Shaw planted the roots of
his holding in Oneby's Case and in even earlier construction of malice
in homicide cases. The point that Shaw ignored entirely was that, while
Oneby was a holding about the burden of a defendant to prove a claim
in a trial on a special verdict, the Massachusetts procedure required
the jury to return a general verdict as to guilt-a difference in procedure which, as we shall see, is not without its implications. Yet Shaw's
opinion was masterful, and the York decision persuaded courts in most
of the American states; echoes of Shaw's opinion was soon heard along
the Eastern seaboard, 77 in the South, 78 and as far west as California.7

72. R. v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 160, 173 Eng. Rep. 441 (N.P. 1837).
73. M'Naghten's Case, 10 CL & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
74. Wvoolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [19351 A.C. 462.
75. The House of Lords extended the Woolminglon rule in Mancini v. Director of
Public Prosecutions, [1942] A.C. 1 (provocation) and Chan Kau v. The Queen. [1955]
A.C. 205 (self-defense).
76. 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 93 (1845).
77. State v. Schweitzer, 57 Conn. 532, 18 A. 787 (1889); People v. Schry-ver, 42 N.Y. 1
(1870); Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1873); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (18S);
State v. Balou, 20 R.L 607, 40 A. 861 (1898).
78. State v. Willis, 63 N.C. 26 (1868); State v. Welsh, 29 S.C. 4, 6 S.E. 894 (1888).

79. People v. Milgate, 5 Cal. 127 (1855); State v. Yokum, 11 S.D.

(1899).

544, 79 N.W. 835
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With but few exceptions, the York precedent governed a half-century
of American burden-of-proof decisions in provocation and self-defense
cases.8 0 And in a few states it reigns today unchallenged. In Delaware,
for example, the York decision was invoked as recently as 1955 to support a holding that the defendant had to prove his claim of self-defense
by a preponderance of the evidence."'
For all of its influence, the Blackstonian rule on the burden of persuasion contains serious flaws. It was born of a particular method of
trial-the special verdict; but it came to be applied as a rule on the
instructions to be given to juries with the responsibility for making
ultimate determinations of guilt. As one passes from one system of trial
to the other, one encounters a critical ambiguity in the phrase "burden
of proof"-an ambiguity that remains in the background of cases like

Oneby, where the court's task is merely to construe gaps in the jury's
specification of the facts. As is well known today, the phrase "burden
of proof" may refer either to the burden of persuasion (the risk that
the jury will regard the issue neither as proven nor as disproven) or to
the burden of going forward (the burden of producing "some evidence"
in order to receive an instruction on the issue).82 The two prongs of the
phrase refer to two different aspects of jury instructions. The burden
of persuasion is expressed in the wording of the instructions; and the
burden of going forward, in the decision whether to give the jury any
instructions on the issue at all. 3 It is significant that the judges of the
80. See authorities cited note 26 supra.

81. Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110 A.2d 445 (1955).
(82.) Contemporary usage stems from Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. Rmv,
45-(1890); J. THAYER, EvmD'caE 853-89 (1898); cf. McKELvEY, EvwENcE 28-29 (1898) (distinguishing beween the burden of proof and the burden of proceeding). German writers
also distinguish
duty to introduce evidence (Beweisfihrungspflict, formclle
Beweislast)
and between
the risk the
of nonpersuasion
Beweislast). The former duty is
precluded in criminal cases by the duty of(materielle
the trial judge actively to investigate and
determine the facts of the case, StPO § 244(2). Nineteenth century writers regarded the
materielle Beweislast as applicable in criminal cases. 3. GrAsan, L uR vom Bawais 88
(1883); A. VON KInas, LEHEBUcH DES DEUTSCHEN SmA PROZ.s
rrs 341 (1892). Contemporary writers frown on the term because it suggests that the prosecutor "loses" If the
accused is acquitted; the German prosecutor is duty-bound to be impartial. 1 E. SciubntT,
LEHRKONIMNTAR ZUm STRAFPROZESSORMNUNG 205 (2d ed. 1964); cf. 1 LonwE-ROSENDamo, Din
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 123 (21st ed. 1963).

83. Significant problems remain in determining (1) when it is fair to shift the burden
of going forward to the defendant; and (2) how much evidence the defendant need offer
to be entitled to a jury determination on a specific issue. Both problems are complicated
by constitutional questions. If the defendant has a right to trial by jury, U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI, that right arguably encompasses all matters related to the defendant's culpability. Further, if the defendant must take the stand in order to secure an instrlction
on an issue, his not receiving the instruction in the event that he does not take the
stand represents a detriment incurred for exercising his privilege against self-incrili
nation, U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See Jackson v. United States, 351 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(acknowledging the constitutional issue).
As an analogue to the common law decision whether to grant a jury instruction on
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Kings Bench in Oneby's Case had no need to distinguish between the
two senses of the term "burden of proof," for their task in that case was
neither to rule on the content of instructions nor to decide whether
instructions ought to have been given. They had merely to render the
appropriate legal characterization of the facts stipulated in the special
verdict.
So far as the rationale of Oneby's Case is applicable in instances of
general verdicts, the language of the opinion ("It lies on the party
indicted to prove the sudden quarrel") may refer either to the burden
of persuasion or to the burden of going forward. The problem, of
course, is deciding to which of these burdens the language of the case
should be deemed to refer. To apply Oneby to cases involving general
verdicts, one must construe it with a view to its historical genesis. The
holding that the defendant must "prove" the issue of provocation or
sudden quarrel derives from a crystallization of decisions and commentary on the relationship between malice, as an element of murder, and
the defense of provocation. The critical step in the conceptual evolution of malice is MacKally's Case. That early 17th century decision, as
reported and interpreted by Coke, stands for the principle that the
prosecution need not prove the element of malice to convict of
murder.84 The judges realized that malice does not lend itself to affirmative proof; by and large, the malicious killing is defined by reference

to what it is not, not by what it is. As agreed by all, one type that was
not malicious was a killing provoked by a sudden quarrel. Thus, to
have a triable issue of malice, one had to have a triable claim that the
defendant killed in the course of a sudden quarrel. MacKally's Case,
holding that the prosecution need not prove malice, generated the
language of Oneby that the defendant must prove the sudden quarrel.
If limited to the concerns of MacKally's Case, the principle of Oneby is
clear: it is up to the defendant, not the prosecution, to raise a triable
issue of malice. This the defendant may do by going forward with
"some evidence" on the issue of provocation by a sudden quarrel;
therefore, in the context of a trial leading to a general verdict, the
Oneby demand that the defendant "prove" the issue should mean no
more than the defendant must go forward with evidence on that issue.
an issue, the civilian judge must decide whether to discuss an issue in his written cvaluation of the evidence. A deficient opinion is a ground for reversal. France: C. no. Pfrv.
§ 593; Germany: StPO § 338(7). E.g., Judgment of December 23, 1897, [18971 Bulletin des
Arrets de la Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle [Bull. Crim.], No. 400 (Cass. crim.,
Fr.) (opinion failed to discuss issue of duress); Judgment of December 9, 1954. [ist sem.

1965] Gazette du Palais Jur. 301 (Cass. crim., Fr.) (failure to discuss self-defense).
84. 9 Co. Rep. 65b, 77 Eng. Rep. 828 (1611).
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For several reasons, Chief Justice Shaw failed to confront the
ambiguity of the "burden of proof" in his York opinion. First, in the
mid-19th century there was little, if any, sensitivity to the ambiguity;80
and more importantly, Shaw's perception of the problem was impeded
by his conflating the judge's role in cases of special verdicts, where the
distinction between the two burdens is insignificant, with the jury's
role in cases of general verdicts, where the distinction is critical. His
language evidences his confusion:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary to establish a fact
against the accused; but preponderating proof-proof sufficient to
satisfy the jury of the fact-is sufficient to establish a fact in his
favor. But it must go to this extent; otherwise, there is nothing on
which the jury can found their beliefs and warrant them in considering the fact proved. It is not sufficient, therefore, to raise a
doubt, even though it be a reasonable doubt of the fact of extenuation, simply because it is no proof of the fact. And here again, we
think the point may be illustrated by considering how the case
would stand on a special verdict.8 0
It may be that in cases decided on special verdicts a fact alleged but
not proved should be equivalent, as Shaw puts it elsewhere in the
opinion, to a fact "not existing."87 For in this type of case, the jury
merely renders findings on a set of discrete factual claims; the jury
must determine the facts one way or another before the judge may
even begin to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. But

in a case on a general verdict, the processes of fact-finding and of
guilt-determination are inseparable; there is no institutional or logical
reason why the jury cannot refuse to return a verdict of guilty upon
the basis of a reasonable doubt as to the existence or nonexistence of
any fact; that is, the jury need not find that there was provocation, as
ina special verdict, but may refuse to find the defendant guilty if it
entertains a reasonable doubt that the killing was without provocation.
Shaw ignored this vital distinction between the special and the general
verdict, and his error continues to affect the course of American law.
85. The Massachusetts court had acknowledged the distinction between the "weight
of the evidence" and the burden of proof. E.g., Powers v. Russell, 80 Mass. (13 Pick.) 69

(1832). For early efforts at clarifying the distinction between the two burdens, see note

82 supra. See generally Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 86 ILL. L. Rtv.

703, 706-13 (1942). Confusion between the two burdens has issued frequently in the Instruction that the defendant must prove his defense but that he should be acquitted If
on all the evidence a reasonable doubt remains as to his guilt. E.g., People v. Knapp,
71 Cal. 1, 11 P. 793 (1886); State v. Jones, 78 Mo. 278 (1883).
86. 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) at 116-17 (1845) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 113.
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That Blackstone's rule won wide acceptance in a procedural context
different from its source s demonstrates the willingness of judges of the
last century and before to demand that defendants prove their defenses
by a preponderance of the evidence. The courts required little authority for their decisions; for the results seemed in keeping with an
intuitively plausible way to structure criminal litigation. And the
plausibility of that system traded on the assimilation of the criminal
process to the model set by the litigation of private disputes. It seemed
natural, in criminal as well as private cases, that certain issues should
adhere to the defendant's case and that proof of these issues should
be the responsibility of the defendant or his lawyer. The resulting
division of the criminal case-into inculpatory and exculpatory issuescalled forth incomplete rules of criminal liability: like the rules of
private law, they were silent on the defensive issues. As a man would

be liable in an action on the case for negligently and proximately
causing harm to another (no mention of assumption of risk), so would
he be liable criminally for intentionally and maliciously killing another
human being (no mention of self-defense and insanity). One like the
other, the rules of the time could be used only when supplemented by
their exceptions.
Another indication of the judicial propensity to treat criminal liability as a matter of incomplete rules supplemented by exceptions is the
reception accorded to the 1816 decision of the King's Bench in The
King v. Turner. 9 The case came before the court on Turner's claim

that he had been improperly convicted for possessing game in violation
of the statute of 5 Anne; his argument was that for any number of
reasons set forth in the statute, his possession of game might have been
lawful and that the conviction was defective because the prosecution
had failed to prove that these exculpatory conditions were absent. A
clever argument it was, but Lord Ellenborough would have none of it.
With the concurrence of the other judges, he held that the prosecution
did not have to submit evidence to prove the absence of what he called
"exceptions" to liability; on these issues, he reasoned, the defendant
bore "the burden of proof." This was the rule in private cases, Lord
Ellenborough conceded, and "there was no reason why the rule should
not be applied to informations as well as actions." 00
88. Blackstone had in mind cases on a special verdict; 4 BLAcTo,,E, CosnirAnns
*201. (The court should decide "how far they [the facts found by the jury] extend to

take away or mitigate the guilt.").
89. 5 M. & S.206, 105 Eng. Rep, 1026 (1816).
90. Id. at 210, 105 Eng. Rep, at 1028.
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The decision in Turner's Case is interesting for a number of reasons.
First, it bespeaks the judicial tendency to regard the tasks of allocating
the burden of persuasion as identical in criminal and in private cases.
Second, it illustrates the kind of judicial overreaching we have already
noted in the common law's reception of the Oneby case. The court
need not have come forth with a pronouncement on the defendant's
"burden of proof," for the question put to the court did not pertain to
resolution of an unclarified dispute. One confronts anew the problem
posed in Oneby's Case: does the phrase "burden of proof" refer to the
burden of persuasion or to the burden of going forward? The ambiguity should be resolved in the same way. Just as one cannot fairly
expect the prosecutor to offer evidence on a vacuous issue like malice,
one cannot expect him to go forward with evidence on all of the numerous statutory grounds for permissibly possessing pheasants and hares.
Yet acknowledging the prosecutor's problems of proof does not compel
the conclusion that the defendant must bear the burden of persuasion
on the issue; his difficulties properly justify only a demand that the
defendant go forward on the issue. Once the defendant has raised a
triable issue under one of the statutory exceptions, one might reasonably expect the prosecutor to bear the risk that the jury in the end
would be in equipoise on the issue.91
This reading of the Turner decision is plausible, but it hardly
meshes with the case's reception in practice. The common law regarded
Turner as it did Oneby as a welcome affirmation of the propriety of
treating criminal defenses like private law defenses. The Turner case
has generated a rare showing of solidarity among common law jurisdictions. On an array of statutory offenses, ranging from the unlawful
possession of narcotics to the unlawful practice of medicine, common
law courts demand that the defendant persuade the trier of fact of his
02
license or authorization to engage in the regulated activity.
This analysis draws heavily on the work of the great James Bradley Thayer, See
EVIDENCE 359-64 (1898).
92. The consensus stems from the mid-ninteenth century. State v,Crowell, 25 MaIne
91.

J. THAYER,

171 (1845) (selling brandy without a license); State v. McGlynn, 34 N.H. 422 (1857)

(keeping liquor for sale without a license); W. RussELL, CRuMES AND MISDEM0ANO1 770
(7th Am. ed. 1909); P. TAYLOR, EVIDENCE 348-55 (8th Eng. ed. 1877) (containing copious
citations to Victorian statutes requiring the defendant to prove lawful excuse or atuthorl.
zation); F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENC E 242 (9th ed. 1884). The rule is accepted today
as a matter of course. Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965) (possession
of narcotics without a prescription); John v. Humphreys, [19551 1 All E.R. 793 (criminal
prosecution for driving without a license); R. v. Oliver, [194V] 2 All E.R. 800 (selling
sugar as wholesaler without a license); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, No. 451
(1958) (permit to sell securities); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2512, at 417 n.4 (3d ed. 1940).
But cf. People v. Zepeda, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1964) (possession of
narcotics; burden on. state to prove lack of authorization).
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In justifying the defendant's duty to persuade the trier of fact of
statutory exceptions, common law judges proceed as though the problem were one at private law. They use the idiom of rules and exceptions; they think in the categories prescribed by the Roman maxim
reus excipiendo fit actor. They interweave rules of pleading with rules
on the burden of persuasion. 3 Thus, if the prosecution need not
negate the statutory exception in the indictment, as is often the case
in liquor and narcotic violations, 4 that is sufficient to prompt a ruling
that the defendant must bear the burden of persuasion on the issue."
But if the prosecution must negate the exception in the indictment, as
is the case in the prosecutions for the unlawful practice of medicine,""
the courts invoke the kinds of arguments that are used to intercept the
usual inference from the duty to plead in private cases. As the private
defendant must prove the defense of payment, the criminal defendant
must prove that he has a license to practice medicine." In both settings

93. E.g., in R. v. Oliver, [1943] 2 All E.R. 800, the court held that the defendant had
to prove that he was licensed to sell sugar as a wholesaler; the opinion stresses a fact

of pleading, namely that the prosecution need not have alleged that the defendant
did not have a license. Id. at 802. See also F. WVuAro%,, CuwAt. EviwicE 334 (9th

ed. 1884) (arguing that the prosecution should have to disprove provocation as an clement implidtly negated by the allegation of malice). As the prosecution must allege the
time and place of the offense in the indictment, common law courts generally hold that
it must establish venue and disprove the running of the statute of limitations. People v.
Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d 252, 282 P.2d 53 (1955) (territorial jurisdiction); People v. James,
59 Cal. App. 2d 121, 138 P.2d 30 (1943) (statute of limitations); People v. Pollock, 26 Cal.
App. 2d 602, 80 P.2d 106 (1938) (venue); State v. Turner, 176 Pa. Super. 32, 107 A.2d
136 (1954) (state had to establish exception tolling statute of limitations). Contra, Traxlor
v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (Crim. Ct. App. 1952) (defense must establish
that the statute has run).
94. There are at least two theories on the need to negate issues like authorization and
license in the indictment. One theory is that the issue must be negated if it is referred
to in the enacting clause, rather than in a proviso, to the statute defining the offense.
State v. McGlynn, 34 N.H. 422, 426 (1857); Comment, The Pleading of Exceptions and
Provisos in Statutes, 8 Ams. JuRisr 233, 234 (1832). Another theory is that it must be
negated if it is a "material part of the definition of the offense," United States v. Cook,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872). See generally Annot., 153 A.LR. 1218 (1944); cf. statutes
providing that the prosecution need not negate specific matters of authorization in the
indictment, Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785; UNIonm
NARcoTic Aar § 18; Indictment rules No. 5 (2), Indictments Act of 1915, 5 & 6 Gco. 5,
ch. 90, sched. 1 (the latter statute providing that the indictment need not negate any
statutory exception, exemption or qualification).
95. Reed v. United States, 210 A.2d 845 (D.C. CL App. 1965) (narcotics); United States
v. Holmes, 187 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1951) (narcotics); State v. Davis, 214 N.C. 787, 1 S.E.2d
104 (1939).
96. The offense of unlawfully practicing medicine (or any other profession) is ctstomarily defined with a phrase of the form "without a license" in the clause defining
the offense (the enacting clause). E.g., CAr. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 2142 (West 1962) ("without having.. . a valid, unrevoked certificate"); WIEsT. VA. CODE § 30-3-9 ("without first

having been licensed for that purpose'). By the conventional rules, the prosecutor must
then aver the lack of license in the indictment. See note 94 supra.
97. People v. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 55 P. 402 (1898); ef. Rossi v. United States,
289 U.S. 89 (1933) (posting a bond to operate a still); People v. Dean, 131 Cal. App. 2.8,

21 P.2d 126 (D.C.A. 1933) (permit to sell securities); Commonw'ealt v. Bitzer, 163 Pa.
Super. 386, 62 A.2d 108 (1948) (license to render service as a public utilit)).
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the courts argue that the facts are within the defendant's knowledge,
or the prosecution need not prove a negative, or convenience demands
that the defendant persuade on the issue. 98 Of course, these arguments
prevail in criminal cases as sporadically and unpredictably as they do
in private cases. 99 But that the courts deploy them in criminal as well
as in private cases demonstrates that the judges regard the problem in
both settings as the same.
Thus, the case for the first claim of this article is made. Before the
turn of the 20th century, jurists in both common law and Continental
jurisdictions approached decisions on the burden of persuasion in
criminal cases as they did in private disputes, and in doing so they
devised rules of criminal liability that had the form of the rules used

for settling private disputes. The judges perceived both kinds of rules
as incomplete statements of the relevant substantive issues: they treated
them as rules that admitted of exceptions.
Whether it was sound policy for 19th century judges to proceed in
this way and for 20th century common law judges to continue the practice depends on whether it is right to treat the criminal process as
though it were litigation akin to the settling of private disputes. To
use rules of liability from private cases is to perceive the criminal
process as though it were a process like private litigation. As we shall
see in the conclusion of this paper, there are defects in that image of
the criminal process. But to reach that conclusion, we must first examine the alternative kind of rule of criminal liability, namely comprehensive rules which neither require nor admit of exceptions. That
examination prompts us to shift our focus to German judicial and
scholarly developments at the end of the 19th century.
IV. Toward Comprehensive Rules of Liability
In the course of a half-century, the German courts achieved a re.
markable reversal of the burden-of-proof practices characteristic of the
West in the 1850's. 100 Despite the radical change of policy, they moved
98. See People v. Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933); People v. Boo Doo
Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 55 P. 402 (1898). On the arguments used to require defendant to
disprove an allegation of the indictment, see Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (933);
Robert v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 13, 234 S.W. 89, 90 (Ct, Crim. App. 1921); B. lJNES,
EvwrDNcE 497 (2d ed. J. Henderson 1926); W. RussEsi, CNIrES AND MISDEMEANOPS 169-71
(7th Am. ed. 1853).
99. See discussion and authorities cited note 14 supra.
100. The leading cases are the judgments of November 13, 1885, 7 Rcehtsprcdting

664 (Reichsgericht, Ger.); and of October 23, 1890, 21 RGSt. 131 (Reidcserlcht, Ger.), In
the first case, the court endorsed the view of a trial judge that both participants in a brawl
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imperceptibly and, as one might think, without much debate on the
matter. There was no cause cdl~bre such as those that often mark the
strides of the common law. There was no insistent call for action from
the prestigious academic community; from all that appears on the
surface, the dramatic judicial advance toward protection of innocent
defendants occurred independently of the cultural processes of the time.
Curiously, the German breakthrough corresponds to a parallel
movement-also occurring in the 1880's and 1890's-in the Western
American states and territories. Many of these American courts then
faced the issue of the burden of persuasion on criminal defenses for
the first time, and they emerged as the first group of common law
courts to break from the Blackstonian rule on self-defense and provocation. 0 1 The Western American and German courts, though cultures
and continents apart, proceeded on the same straightfonvard analysis

of the criminal process. They were both able to generate a view of the
problem unhaunted by the private law orientations of Blackstone and
Feuerbach. For the first time, American and German courts grasped
the full force of the principle, acknowledged nominally by Blackstone
and Feuerbach, that the state may punish a man for crime if, and only
if, he is guilty of an offense. The difficulty with this proposition is, of
course, that it verges on tautology. If guilt means legal guilt, the
proposition reduces to the vapid claim that only those who are liable
under the law are liable to criminal punishment. For the proposition
to be significant, the concept of guilt must be independent of the positive legal order. In the late 19th century, the German courts and some
common law courts emphasized the independence of the concept of
guilt from positive law by affirming anew the moral content of criminal guilt. 10 2 And in so doing they converted a long-standing truism of
the law into a moral justification for imposing criminal sanctions.
Thrusting the issue of guilt, or blameworthiness, to the forefront

should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense if it appeared possible that either might
have started it; however, the court did reverse the acquittal of one of the brawlers on the
ground that the opinion of the trial judge did not adequately discuss the elements of
self-defense. In the second case, the court affirmed an acquittal on the ground of insanity.
According to the opinion of the trial judge, there was a "probability" of insanity. Apparently, the prosecution thought that this was not enough for an acquittal; the court held
that a "possibility" of insanity was sufficient to acquit.
101. A. VON FEuERBACH, supra note 57, § 54, at 43-44, & § 616, at 397; 4 BLACrsrO.E,
ComsA=ARms *358, 360; cf. Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. York, 51 Mas (9 Mete.)
93, 116 (1845) (arguing that the defendant's guilt consisted in voluntarily killing another,
i.e., that doubts on the issue of provocation were not tantamount to doubts on the
defendant's guilt).
102. See cases cited notes 103-06 infra and the earlier cases on the insanity defenses,

e.g, State v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868); Hopps v. People, 31 MII.
385 (1863).
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of the criminal process enabled the courts to see the defensive issues
with fresh perspective. If all substantive issues, both inculpatory and
exculpatory, were threads in the fabric of guilt, then the differences
among them appeared less significant. The distinction between whether
harm had been done and whether the harm was justified by a claim
of self-defense no longer appeared to be an adequate basis for bifurcating the rules of criminal liability. And accordingly the distinction no
longer seemed a persuasive ground for allocating the burden of persuasion. Proceeding from the premise that the prosecutor had to prove
the defendant's guilt, the courts of Germany and of some of less
populous Western states (Wyoming,1 0 3 Nevada 0 4 and New Mexico' 0 3)
readily came to the position that the prosecution had to disprove
properly raised claims of self-defense and insanity.
The emergence of guilt as the focal point of criminal cases served
to set off the criminal process from the litigation of private disputes.
This function of the concept of guilt is illustrated by an 1894 decision
of the German Supreme Court rejecting the extension to private disputes of the standards then emerging for allocating the burden of
persuasion in criminal cases. 10 The case came to the Supreme Court
as an appeal from the trial judge's finding for the defendant in a tort
action for assault and battery. To justify his judgment, the trial judge
wrote that "it appeared probable" that the defendant's striking the
plaintiff with a staff was warranted as an act of self-defense. The trial
judge had invoked the emerging rule for criminal cases that the
prosecutor should bear the risk of doubt on the issue of self-defense.
His mistake, the Supreme Court reasoned, lay in assuming that a rule
devised for criminal cases should apply in private litigation. In the
Court's view, the two processes were radically different. In a tort action,
the claim of self-defense was not "merely a denial of the plaintiff's
case" but the "setting up of a new matter." Thus, it fell to the defendant to prove the issue fully, not by a showing of probability, but
to the complete satisfaction of the trier-of-fact. The reason for demanding more of a defendant in a private action than in a criminal prosecution is that no concept of the private legal order functions as does the
concept of guilt in the criminal process: no concept used in settling
private disputes converts the set of defensive issues into a fundamen103. Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 21 P. 1081 (1889).
104. State v. McCluer, 5 Nev. 152 (1869).
105. Territory v. Lucero, 8 N.M. 543, 46 P. 18 (1896).

106. Judgment of May 8, 1894, 33 Entschiedungen des Reichsgericlts In Zlvilbaden
[RGZ] 352.
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tally necessary condition of the defendant's liability. But while no concept of the private law renders the mere probability of self-defense
inconsistent with the defendant's liability, the German Supreme Court
perceived that the concept of guilt does serve this function in criminal
cases:
[C]riminal sanctions should be used only against the guilty, a
principle with which it would be inconsistent for a judge to hold
a defendant guilty of intentional battery, even though it appeared
probable or possible that the act was required by self-defense. 0 7
In addition to-or perhaps more properly as a corollary of-altering
allocations of the burden of proof on specific issues, the newly perceived centrality of guilt in the criminal process also stimulated the
German trend toward comprehensive rules of criminal liability. If the
prosecution should be charged with proving the defendant's guilt, then
the appropriate rules of liability should specify all the ingredients of
guilt. And the ingredients of guilt, in turn, should be coextensive with
the set of substantive issues bearing on guilt or innocence. Shortly
after the innovations of the German courts in the late 19th century,
the German scholars synthesized a long-developing theoretical structure
for formulating rules of liability to encompass all the substantive issues
that might arise at trial.108 Conditions in the common law countries
might have yielded a comparable development, but none occurred.
And the need for comprehensive rules of criminal liability persists in
common law practice. We continue to think of rules of criminal liability as another example of the species of rule common in private
litigation. 0 9 By studying the emergence of comprehensive rules of
criminal liability in German practice, we might better understand the
role that such rules have to play.
The watershed of German criminal theory is Ernst Beling's work
Die Lehre vom Verbrechen, published in 1906. The book's theoretical
contributions are renowned for reasons having little to do with comprehensive rules of liability or the procedural rule of in dubio pro reo.
Beling's major effort was an attempt to clarify that aspect of every
107. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
108. See H. SCHwEmERT, DIE WAADLUNGEN

DE

TATBEsrANDSLEInE sErr BELLG 7-13

(1957).
109. See, e.g.,

MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02, 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (a
defensive claim of duress avoids rather than denies the prosecution's claim of "culpability"); Katz &-Goldstein, Abolish the "Insanity Defensc.-Wihy Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853,
865 (self-defense termed "an exception to criminal liability'); Comment Airnative
Defenses UnderNew York's New Penal Law, 19 SYRAcusE L. REv. 44 (1967). See also Hart,

The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PRo.. Ams'ro'tLAN Soc. 171 (n.s. 1949).
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criminal offense that might be defined without reference to value considerations. He believed that a hard core of every offense, the set of
issues he called the Tatbestand, could be defined to be free of all condemnatory judgment."10 Thus, according to his theory, the Tatbestand
of murder would consist of the human act causing death. An accidental
killing would be enough, but that fact in itself would not be enough
to condemn the actor."]
For the purposes of this study, the relevant aspect of Beling's work is
his categorization for the value-laden issues of criminal liability. This
was the aspect of his work that facilitated the emergence of comprehensive rules of liability. According to his system, questions of value
intrude upon the analysis of liability only after the judge as trier of
fact determines that the facts meet the definitional demand of the
Tatbestand. The issues requiring judgments of value fall into two
categories: (1) issues suggesting the blameworthiness of the act causing
harm (Rechtswidrigkeit); and (2) issues suggesting the blameworthiness
of the actor (Schuld). The distinction between the blameworthiness
of acts and of actors is critical to the structure Beling imposed on the
substantive issues of criminal liability. It provides a systematic grouping for all the substantive defenses that might arise at trial. The grouping proceeds on the assumption that all defensive issues relate either
to the question whether the act, objectively, is socially unacceptable,
or to the question whether the actor, subjectively, is blameworthy.
Examples of the first category of defense are self-defense and consent;

and examples of the second category are duress and insanity. The two
categories correspond roughly to the common law usage of the terms
justification and excuse.
The tripartite structure of criminal liability that crystallized in
Beling's work, namely Tatbestand, Rechtswidrigkeit and Schuld, pro.
110. It is hard to find a common law term corresponding to the German Tatbestand.
The term "elements of the offense" is a conclusionary concept of variable content.
Compare Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110 A.2d 445 (1955) (self.defense not an "clement
of the crime') with Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 260, 369 P.2d 54 (1962) (self-defense
considered one of the "essential elements necessary to constitute the crime charged"),
The term "corpus delicti" is used to determine the admissibility of confessions and thuis
does not refer to the agency of the accused. State v. Hassen, 144 Cal. App. 2d 334, 801
P.2d 80 (1956). Glanville Williams' definition of actus reus as the "whole definition of
the crime with the exception of the mental element" is perhaps the closest common law
analogue to the German concept. G. WnuAMs, CamuiNAL LAw 18 (2d ed. 1961); cf. te
French concept of l'dldment matdriel, 2 P. BouzAT S- J. PINATEL, TRArr DE DROIr PiNAL
Er DE CRIMINOLOGIE 914 (1963).
111. Beling's rigid bifurcation of factual and evaluative elements came under scrutiny
as early as 1915. M. E. MAYER, DER ALLGEMEINE TElL DEs DEUTSCtiEN STRAFncCIr' 182 f.
(1915). For a contemporary discussion of the problem, see K. H. KUNERT, Dm NonhtrAN
MERKMALE DER STRARECHTLICHEN TATBESTXENDE
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vides a schema for ordering all substantive issues relating to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 1 2 By asking a series of three questions
-(1) Did the defendant bring about a result proscribed by the legislature? (2) Is the act socially unacceptable (unjustified)? and (3) Is the
actor personally blameworthy (without excuse)?-the German judge
progresses through a comprehensive, unified ordering of the issues of
liability. And the conclusion of guilt requires an affirmative finding
in all three categories of the inquiry. The three categories represent
equal yokes of the state's burden to establish the defendant's susceptibility to punishment; and today, as a matter of course, the German
prosecutor bears the risk of the trier's residual doubt on the substantive
issues of all three categories.
All rules of criminal liability are read against this structure, and the
structure is implicit in every rule stated. It is this characteristic of
German law that gives the rules of liability their comprehensiveness;
it is not that each rule of the criminal code refers expressly to the three
categories of analysis. For it is well understood by all those who use
the code that the rule is to be applied by reading it against the back-

ground of the tripartite structure of issues. In fact, this understanding
among German jurists enables the draftsmen of criminal legislation
to prune words from the statutory statement of rules. For example,
Section 134(1) of the pending Draft Criminal Code provides cryptically:
whoever kills another is guilty of Totschlag. The provision omits all
reference to the defenses, to the unlawfulness of the killing, to the
social unacceptability of the act and to the blameworthiness of the
actor. It does not even mention the well-understood requirement that
the killing be intentional. All of these ingredients of the offense are
assumed. The statutory rule, read against the doctrinal tradition of
the legal system, demands that the judge make specific findings in the
three categories of issues related to the defendant's guilt.
It would be a mistake to think that the tripartite structure of German
criminal theory corresponds to the common law requirements of actus
reus and mens rea for criminal liability. At the most, these Latin
phrases when used at all these days stipulate two of the minimal condi112.

The tripartite division is fixed in German theory, even though the allocation of

issues to the three categories has changed since the time of Ileling. The primary shift
was wrought by Welzel's finale Handlungslehre, according to which the factors of inten-

tion and unreasonable risk-taking are considered as elements of the Tatbesland instead
of elements of Schuld; the category of Schuld is thus acknowledged to be an evaluative
rather than a psychological inquiry. See H. WELzEL, Ar-rutTEL
SmRaxRc:rrs.nontr..& M3
RAHM?.N DER FINALEN HANDLUNGS.EHE (1953); H. WVEIzEL, DAs Drurscnm STrnUrarr
2942 (9th ed. 1965).
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tions of criminal liability. No one should be guilty of crime, these
rubrics tell us, unless he has committed an act and has a guilty mind
(or at least an intent to do something). The terms actus reus and mens
rea help us little in understanding the relationship between the putatively defensive issues, say self-defense and duress, and the other issues
of criminal liability. Indeed, these Latin rubrics readily supported the
19th century pattern of separating the issues of criminal liability into
rules and exceptions. The rules consist of the actus reus and the mens
rea (e.g., as to murder, the actus reus is the act of killing, and the
mens rea is the intention to kill), and the exceptions to these rules are
all the remaining defensive issues.
One might question whether a tripartite systemization of substantive
issues was either necessary or desirable. Could we not render our rules
comprehensive, the skeptic might ask, simply by reading them against
the full panoply of defenses and exceptions of the criminal law? Indeed, is that not in fact what we do now in administering the law of

crimes in Anglo-American jurisdictions? It is true that common lawyers
know the defenses of liability in much the same way the German
lawyers are conversant with the structure of the issues bearing on the
defendant's guilt, but there is an important difference. The point of
the systemization of issues and of the resulting comprehensive rules of
liability is not to enable lawyers to keep the issues in mind. It is not a
mnemonic device to facilitate mastery of the law. Structuring the issues
overcomes the image of exculpatory issues as exceptions to rules of
liability. For example, as a result of being subsumed under the second
stage of inquiry, namely whether the causing of harm is rechtsiwidrig
(socially unacceptable), the defense of self-defense no longer appears as
"new matter." Rather, very much like the fact that the defendant pulled
the trigger, the claim of self-defense functions as a denial of one of the
elements of the prosecutor's case. By ordering the defenses under affirmative inquiries, the German tripartite system converts exceptions
into denials; it transforms issues appearing in the common law as "new
n 3
matter" into unavoidable steps in the process of determining guilt.1
There is more to the comprehensive, structured view of criminal liability than conceptual neatness. The German tripartite structure stands
for an analytic and moral claim about the relationship among the issues
bearing on the defendant's criminal guilt. The claim is simply that all
113. This kind of reasoning has been instrumental in the strides of the common law.
See Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385 (1863) (insanity seen as a denial of defendant's criminal
intent); Woohnington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462 (a clain of
accidental homicide treated as a denial of intentional homicide).
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the substantive issues of liability are on an equal footing: for purposes
of determining liability, there is no significant difference between
causing harm, intending it, intending it in self-defense, and intending
it under duress. That some of these issues may appear in the affirmative
and some in the negative is irrelevant. The decisive point is that all

bear on the defendant's guilt or innocence. If it is agreed that the
prosecutor should bear the risk of residual doubt on one of these issues,
then he should bear that risk on all of them.
In sum, the German tripartite structure builds on two related claims
about criminal liability. The first premise is that all defenses bearing
on guilt function as challenges to a comprehensive rule of liability; one
need never characterize an issue as an exception. And the second
premise is that with respect to the risk of residual doubt in trying the
defendant's guilt, all issues bearing on his guilt should be treated alike.
No common lawyer has ever put forth such sweeping claims. Yet one
can perceive traces of these views in at least some quarters of the contemporary trend away from Blackstone's rule on the burden of persuasion in criminal cases. In particular, in cases holding that the prosecutor
bears the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt a properly
raised claim of insanity, one finds confrontation with the liturgy of
rules and exceptions borrowed from private litigation. Notable among
these decisions is the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis v. United
States" 4 in 1895, which initiated the movement of the federal courts
toward widespread application of the policy of acquitting defendants
in cases of doubt on substantive issues. The language of the opinion
evidences the Court's commitment to many of the points then emerging
as central claims of German doctrine:
The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil action
which, admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive
arounds of defense by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in
confession and avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts the
existence of every fact essential to constitute the crime charged.
Upon that plea the accused may stand, shielded by the presumption of his innocence, until it appears that he is guilty; and his
guilt cannot, in the very nature of things, be regarded as proved
if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt from all the evidence
whether he was legally capable of committing crime.1 1
The reasoning of the Davis opinion readily supports an extension
114. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
115. Id. at 485-86.
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of the holding to defenses like self-defense and provocation, for these
too challenge facts "essential to constitute the crime charged." And in
cases following Davis, the federal courts have come to demand that
the prosecutor bear the risk of residual doubt on these defenses too.'"0
Of course, the defendant must still go forward and produce "some evi-

dence" to support his claim of self-defense or insanity, but once the
issue is properly raised, the proper instructions to the jury specify only
the prosecutorial burden to disprove the defensive claim beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The pattern of the federal courts is but one of two distinct patterns
of reform that emerge from the common law trend toward comprehensive rules of liability. The difference between the two trends suggests a correlation between the prominence accorded the actor's moral
culpability and the extent of reform of the Blackstonian rules on the
burden of persuasion. The pattern exemplified by the federal courts
is one of sweeping reform; the courts following this pattern begin with
a ruling on the insanity defense, typically based on a perception of
the all-encompassing significance of moral guilt in assessing criminal
liability,11 7 and extend the holding by analogy to all of the other
11 8
traditional defenses.
The decisions of courts in California and England indicate another
pattern of reform. Courts conforming to this pattern tend to be guarded
in their revisions of the Blackstonian liturgy. Typically, they begin
with a ruling that the prosecution must disprove claims of accident and
provocation in homicide cases.11 9 They reason by analogy from their
precedents on accident and provocation to parallel rulings on selfdefense; but they fail to go further. They fail to make the analogical
leap from self-defense and provocation to insanity. 120 In these juris116. Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961) (acknowledging rule as to

coercion); Frank v. United States, 42 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1930) (self-defense),

117. Johnson v.1 United States, 291 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1961) (acknowledging rule that
prosecution must disprove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt); Frank v. United States,
42 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1930) (relying on Davis to recast the rule on self-defense).
118. Jurisdictions conforming to this pattern include Illinois: Hopps v. People, a1
IlM.385 (1863) (insanity), extended in People v. Duncan, 315 111. 106, 145 N.E. 810 (1924)
(self-defense); Michigan: People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868) (insanity), extended in People
v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704 (1887); New York: People v. McCann, 16 N.Y. 58 (1857) (In.
sanity), extended in People v. Downs, 123 N.Y. 558, 25 N.E. 988 (1890) (self.defense).
119. E.g., Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462 (accident);
People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 P. 127 (1889) (accident).
120. Woolmington was extended to self-defense in R. v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 160, 178
Eng. Rep. 441 (1837), but the English courts still expect the accused to persuade on the
issue of insanity. R. v. Smith, 6 Crim. App. 19 (1910) (apparently the latest appellate
ruling). Similarly in California, the courts extended the rule of Bushton to encompass
self-defense, People v. Toledo, 85 Cal. App. 2d 570, 193 P.2d 953 (1948), but not insanity,
People v. Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64, 273 P. 779 (1928); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 894
P.2d 959 (1964).
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dictions the decisions stimulating reform thus are frequently of limited
generality. To hold that the prosecution must disprove a claim of accident, the courts may rely entirely on formal doctrinal moves. When
the House of Lords refused in Woolmington to apply the Blackstonian
rule to a defense of accident in a homicide case, the judges thought it
sufficient to note that the prosecution must prove an intentional homicide and that the claim of accident negated the intentionality of the
killing. Neither Woolmington nor its progeny confronted the general
significance of moral guilt in burden-of-persuasion cases. And not having confronted that issue, the English courts have yet to perceive the
inconsistency of imposing differential treatment on two defensesself-defense and insanity-that are both related to the defendant's
culpability in violating the law.

V. The Contours of Comprehensive Rules
The general course of Western criminal law is toward comprehensive
rules of liability, yet it is a course marked by eddies of locally idio-

syncratic rules. Most Western courts concur in the postulate that only
the morally guilty should be sacrificed for the sake of social control;
yet they might disagree about what circumstances render men morally
guilty. And even if reason requires a conclusion that a particular matter, like insanity, is relevant to a determination of the defendant's
guilt or blameworthiness, some courts might balk at the dictates of
reason and consistency. These are two problems, then, that require
further discussion. We turn first to the problems that courts have had
in determining the contours of the concept of blameworthiness; and
secondly, to the reasons why some courts which acknowledge the principle that only those who have culpably broken the law should suffer

criminal sanctions may nonetheless refuse to accept the consequences
of that principle in every particular.
A. Claims That Exculpate the Defendant and Those That Do Not
Most criminal defenses exculpate the defendant from charges of

moral wrongdoing. If, like self-defense, the defense is a justification,
it stands for the claim that the defendant's behavior was socially ac-

ceptable or even commendable. If, like duress, it is an excuse, it argues
that though the defendant's conduct was unjustified he is personally

blameless. To express our conclusion we say that acts under duress and
necessity are involuntary. And that conclusion, coupled with the
principle that men are not accountable for involuntary conduct, func-
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tions to excuse men who have acted under duress or necessity from the
charge of blameworthy conduct.
The insanity defense is not so readily classifiable as an exculpatory
claim, but the reason for uncertainty here is less theoretical than institutional. It is clear from the criteria articulated in adjudicating the
insanity defense that it rests squarely on the view that insane defendants cannot fairly be blamed for their acts. They are to be excused,
the courts say, if they were not "responsible" at the time they committed the criminal act with which they are charged. This general
criterion and the rhetoric which supports the insanity defense sound
unmistakably in the idiom of blameworthiness.
Doubt arises only because as it functions today the insanity defense
often does not serve to separate those subject to state sanctions from
those who may remain free. It functions rather merely to determine

whether the social response to the defendant's conduct (condition) is
to be imprisonment or hospitalization. A jury finding of sanity leads
to penal confinement; and of insanity, to custodial and therapeutic
confinement. In at least twelve states, the commitment of those found
insane is mandatory. 121 In the remaining jurisdictions, the prosecution
must make a nominal showing of the defendant's continuing dangerousness to secure commitment; yet in practice, as Goldstein reports,
commitment in these jurisdictions too tends to be automatic. 122
The institutional problem derives from using one concept to answer
two different questions. A jury finding of sanity is a reply to the question: is the accused sufficiently blameworthy to be justly subjected to
penal confinement? But as it presently functions a finding of insanity
answers the question: is the accused sufficiently dangerous to be justifiably committed? Thus, the findings of sanity and insanity speak to
different issues; the ostensible link between them is the inference that
a man insane at the time of his illegal deed is sufficiently dangerous at
the time of the trial to be justifiably deprived of his liberty. The
inference is hardly warranted in fact, yet it enjoys the appearance of
respectability. One reason might be that in the absence of accepted
standards governing the degree of dangerousness necessary to justify
civil commitment, any threshold of danger seems tenable. And perhaps
even an untenably low threshold is buttressed in the minds of some
by the law's assumedly beneficial therapeutic purpose, which is fre121. For a list of the jurisdictions, see Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following
a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409, 411 n.8 (1961).
122. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 144-45 (1967). See also Katz & J. Goldstein,
Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not? 72 YA.E LJ. 853, 867-68 (1963).
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quently used to justify civil commitment in all cases of mental illness.
If judges viewed the insanity defense solely as a means of selecting
one of two alternate modes of confinement, they might understandably
require the defendant to persuade on the issue. As a purely dispositional test, insanity is of course extrinsic to the analysis of the accused's
culpability. Thus, if the use of the defense is seen as an effort by a
culpable defendant to secure therapeutic confinement, one might require him to prove that his condition warrants hospitalization. The trouble with this view of the insanity defense is that it is plausible only on the assumption that an insane man's blameworthiness
justifies his confinement. But if he successfully raises such a defense, the
courts all say the defendant is not culpable. If he is not culpable, the
critical question is not how or where he should be confined, but on
what ground he may be confined at all. A possible alternative to culpability as a justification for confinement is present dangerousness to
others. But in civil commitment proceedings, to confine the dangerous,
even under the vague standards of the existing law, the state bears the

burden of showing that the accused is sufficiently dangerous to be committed. There is no reason to relieve it of that burden in the wake of an
acquittal by reason of insanity, unless the burden could be carried
merely by a showing of insanity at the time of the commission of an
illegal act.
Thus the therapy needed for the schizophrenic insanity defense is
the separation of its conflicting personalities: blameworthiness at the
time of the act is one issue, and dangerousness at the time of trial is

another. The two questions must be decided independently; the first
by the jury in applying the test of sanity, the second by the court after
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Whether it seeks penal
or custodial confinement, the state must bear the burden of proving
that it may justifiably deprive the defendant of his liberty. If the

issues are so separated, the concept of insanity comes into focus: when
not used improperly as a rationale for civil commitment, the issue of
insanity appears as closely tied to the accused's blameworthiness as are
the issues of self-defense and duress.
While issues such as self-defense, consent, necessity and duress are
dearly tied to the defendant's culpability, there is an array of factual
questions at trial, like those of venue and the statute of limitations,
that are unrelated to the evaluation of his conduct. These are matters
123. See Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALF. L
REv. 805, 805-06 (1961).
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on which the common law prosecutor must make allegations of fact

in his indictment (the date and place of the alleged offense) and on
which the jury must make findings of fact. Yet they are not circumstances that are relevant in deciding whether to blame the defendant
for what he has done. Rather they are factual conditions for fairly and
accurately trying the facts of the alleged offense. Today virtually all
Western jurisdictions require the prosecutor to prove that the offense
was committed within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations; but the reasons for the concurrence of views are as diverse as the
12 4
styles of Continental and common law courts.
Between the poles of self-defense and the statute of limitations, one
finds a few issues whose rationale and purpose have befuddled common
law and Continental courts. The common law defense of entrapment,
for example, is an institution of shifting rationale. If one stresses the
requirement of the defense that police officers "implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit an offense,' 25 the issue
appears as closely associated to the blameworthiness of the actor as the
circumstance of duress. In one case the actor is seduced by the wiles
of his temptor; in the other he is coerced by the threats of an overbearing will. In neither case is his action the expression of his own
choice rather than that of another. This interpretation is supported by
the unavailability of the defense to those "predisposed" to the commission of the offense, 126 for they, as persons not actually seduced by

the circumstances, are as blameworthy as anyone else who has committed the proscribed act. This view of the defense prevails in the
federal courts; 127 and thus, consistently with the demands of comprehensive rules, the trend among the federal circuits is to require the
prosecution to bear the risk of residual doubt on a properly raised
claim of entrapment. 28s

124.
125.

Compare the discussion in note 22 supra, with that in note 93 supra.
Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (initial Supreme Court con-

struction of the doctrine).
126. E.g., Matysek v. United States, 321 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S,
917 (1964); Trent v. United States, 284 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S.
889 (1961); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
127. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Accardi v. United States, 257
F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958); 45 TExAS L. REv. 578 (1967);
But cf. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963) (emphasis
on "duty of police not to corrupt citizens').
128. Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Notaro v. United States,
363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967). JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ON THE SEVENTH FEDMAL CMCUIT, JURY INsTRUCriONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CASEs § 5.02, at 26 (1965). The Second Circuit has held to Judge Learned Hand's dictum

in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952), that the accused hag the
"burden" on the issue of inducement; the court is now inclined, however, to interpret
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Critics of this view assimilate the defense to the various devices for
controlling improper police behavior, such as the rule excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence. 129 The defense of entrapment is not
available to those tempted to commit crimes by private parties; there-

fore, the critics argue, the purpose of the defense is clearly not to
exculpate those led astray by the prompting of others. Besides, one
might add, it is one thing to excuse men coerced by threats of violence
and quite another to excuse those who merely succumb to temptation.
Indeed, succumbing to temptation is a paradigm case of blameworthy
conduct. If one excuses a girl who succumbs to an offer of prostitution,
one should also excuse officials who are seduced by attractive bribes.
Thus, entrapment may not be an excuse at all; properly construed it
may be a device designed solely to discipline police behavior. This view
finds its most vigorous expression in the Model Penal Code, which in
commentary labels the defense "a complaint by the accused against
the state for employing a certain kind of unsavory enforcement."'3 0
This characterization, taken together with the Roman maxim ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, readily supports casting the burden of
persuasion on the issue to the defendant; if he is the plaintiff on the
"complaint" of entrapment, then general principles require that he
support his claim by at least a preponderance of the evidence. This
indeed is the Code's position on the burden of persuasion in entrapment disputes. 131
As the Model Penal Code is at odds with the present stance of the
federal courts on the rationale of entrapment, so the German courts
and scholars have clashed on the appropriate interpretation of the
defense of voluntarily abandoning an attempt prior to consummation.
Consider the case of one who pours gasoline on the floor of a warehouse
and strikes a match with the intent to set the place ablaze; at the last
minute he has a change of heart and puts the match out. His acts went
far enough to constitute attempted arson. Yet Section 46 of the German

Criminal Code would insulate him from punishment, 1 2 and one
the "burden" as the burden of going forward, United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955 (2d
Cir. 1966).

129. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent

YAM .nJ. 1091, 1111 (1951); MODEL PE.NAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959); Comment, Due Process of Law and the Entrapment Defense, 1964
U. Iz.. L.F. 821; Note, Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 B.U.L. RE%,. 542

Provocateurs, 60
(1965).

10. MODEL PENAL CODE
131. MODEL PENAL CODE

§

2.10, Comment, at 21 (rent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

§ 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

132. StGB § 46(1) provides: "An attempt shall not be punished if the actor abstains
from the execution of the contemplated [criminal] act without being impeded in the
execution of the act by factors independent of his will." See SnrE-Scitun6n, Sm.AFGEs"ZBUCH § 46 (13th ed. 1967).
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wonders why. What is the rationale for not punishing a man who,
having done enough to be guilty of an attempt, abandons his criminal
plan? Should we say that the attempt was culpable, but that the legal

system waives its prerogative to punish in order to encourage other
would-be arsonists to desist at the last moment? Or should we construe
the abandonment as an indication that the defendant's intent to commit arson was never sufficiently firm to render him blameworthy of an
attempt to commit the offense? Either description suffices to explain
abandonment as a defense; yet on the first view, the defense is extrinsic
to the determination of the defendant's personal guilt; on the second
view, it is an essential part of that inquiry. The first rationale of the
defense prevailed in German law until the late 1950's, when an opinion
of the German Supreme Court, born of skepticism as to the likelihood
of deflecting criminal plans with the promise of immunity, changed
the focus of the defense's rationale to the culpability or personal guilt
of the actor. 133 With this change in rationale the burden of persuasion
on the issue has come to rest. Under the former view of the defense,
the defendant had to prove a claim of voluntary abandonment by a
preponderance of the evidence. 3 4 Today there is little room to debate
the German prosecutor's responsibility for resolving doubts on the
issue. As an issue related to the culpability of one who attempts an
offense, the claim of voluntary renunciation falls, without challenge,
within the scope of the maxim in dubio pro reo.13
Relating an issue to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct
is not, of course, a necessary condition for imposing the risk of residual
doubt on the prosecution; the prosecution often bears that risk on
matters like the statute of limitations that are unrelated to blameworthiness. Yet, as the history of entrapment in the United States and

abandonment in Germany indicates, the rationale of a defensive issue
is often a sufficient condition for imposing the burden of persuasion on
the prosecution. Thus, perceiving the reason for the state's decision
133. Judgment of February 28, 1956, 9 BGHSt 48 (Bundesgericht, Ger.): "In most
cases the actor attempting an offense does not think about the penal consequences. Often
he will not even know, still less keep in mind, that he can escape punishment by abandoning his attempt. . . . It would be more accurate to formulate the rationale of StGB
§ 46(1) in this way: That an actor voluntarily abandons an attempt indicates that his
criminal intent was not as firm as would have been required for execution of the offense."
Id. 52. But cf. H. WEz.LZ,
DAs DEUTSCHE STPAFRECHT 176 (9th ed. 1965) (maintaining
the traditional view that the purpose of the rule is to induce men to desist from their
attempted offenses).
134. J. GLAsSa, IYHE vom BwEis 94-95 (1883); A. VON KRms, supra note 82, at 341.
135. Judgment of February 19, 1963, 18 BGH~t 274, 276 (Bundesgerichtschof, Ger,.)
(dictum that the application of in dubio pro reo was "self-evident" in cases under Section
46(1)).
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under particular circumstances not to punish men who have attempted
or caused harm becomes a matter of practical importance; knowing
why we do not punish can affect the tactical position of the defendant
at trial. If the rationale for a particular defensive issue is that under
the circumstances the defendant is not to blame for his conduct, then

by the dominant trend of Western law, the prosecution must disprove
the factual claims of the defense precisely as it must prove that the
defendant was the one who fired the homicidal bullet. If, on the other
hand, the purpose of incorporating the issue into the set of conditions
for punishing the defendant is to discipline police behavior or to deflect criminal plans with a promise of immunity, then common law and
Continental courts might be receptive to the argument that the defendant should prove his "complaint" against the police or his "petition"
for immunity.
It is tempting to resolve disputes over the rationale of borderline
issues like entrapment and abandonment with an eye to the impact of
competing rationales on the burden of persuasion. But this is not the
plane on which the debates on these issues have actually taken place.
To allocate the burden of persuasion on entrapment on the basis of
the rationale for the defense, and then to rationalize the defense in
terms of the preferred result on the burden of persuasion, would be to
travel in a needless circle; one might as well avoid the journey and rule
squarely on the burden of persuasion. The problem of construing the
rationale for defensive issues is not one of determining what rationale
we ought to adopt, but of fathoming the reasons why we do in fact
permit the defenses we do. The task is not one of setting goals for legal
action, but of clarifying the goals actually being pursued.
This is not to suggest, however, that political and practical criteria
have never affected judicial allocations of the burden of persuasion.
Indeed it is precisely the concern for these considerations that accounts
for the tenacity of rules requiring the defendant to prove issues like
self-defense and insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. To isolate

these factors of politics and practicality, we shall turn to the arena in
which they do in practice affect the allocation of the burden of
persuasion.
Politics and Practicality in Allocating the Burden of Persuasion
As we have seen, the premise of a court's conclusion that the defendant must bear the burden of persuasion on a particular issue is frequently the classification of the issue as one extrinsic to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. On some issues, that
B.
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classification reflects concern less for the explanation of the issue's
relevance at trial, than for the practical impact of viewing the defense
one way or the other. The diverse political and practical considerations that may so affect an allocation of the burden of persuasion
coalesced in a series of dramatic 1949 decisions by the High Court for
the British Zone in Germany,sa1 in which the Court systematically
reversed the acquittal of doctors who participated, directly and organizationally, in Hitler's "brave new" euthanasia program for the mentally
ill. As a guide to the political factors that often influence allocation
of the burden of persuasion, these cases merit detailed attention.
The doctors, accused of aiding and abetting criminal homicide,
sought to justify their participation in the planned secret killings of
hospital inmates; they argued that the deaths they were responsible
for were justified by their efforts to save as many lives as they could
under the circumstances. And in at least one case the defendant doctors
presented evidence that they struck names from the lists of the fated
and thereby sought to minimize the systematic killing. They had no
choice but to soil their hands with Hitlerian evil, they argued, for if
they had not done so other doctors would have intervened, with the
same devastating consequences for an even greater number of hospital
inmates. This utilitarian-sounding argument was cast in the form of
an analogy to an abortion performed in order to spare the life of the
mother. As the abortionist sacrifices the lesser value for the greater
good, the doctors allegedly killed a few to save a greater number. If
one should take the numerous factual premises of the claim as given,
the plight of the doctors might engage the sympathy and even the
respect of the utility-minded man. Apparently, the triers-of-fact-in
one case a judge and in the other a jury composed of judges and laymen-were moved by the argument, for they acquitted the defendants
on the grounds of extra-legal necessity, the defense hewn by the prewar German courts to justify abortions necessitated by danger to the
37
life of the mother.
The High Court reversed the acquittals on the ground that the de.
fense of extra-legal necessity did not apply to the facts: the defense
presupposed the sacrifice of a lesser value (like a fetus) to spare a higher
interest (the life of the mother). In saving some of the doomed in136 Judgment of March 5, 1949, 1 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofs fOr die
Britische Zone 321; Judgment of July 23, 1949, 2 Id. 117.
137. See Judgment of March 11, 1927, 61 RGSt. 242 (Relchsgericht, Ger.); H. WVELzEL,
supra note 133, at 82-84.
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mates, one could not be acting in the interest of a higher value; for,
as the opinions argue, the existence of those sacrificed was of fully
equal dignity with that of the inmates allegedly spared by the defendants' efforts. Since the values were of the same plane, sacrificing one
for the sake of the other was not morally justifiable. On this view of the
defense of extra-legal necessity, the courts reversed the acquittals and
remanded for new trials.
The relevance of this snippet of legal history lies in the fact that the
High Court did not go so far as to suggest that there was no defense
on the facts. On the contrary, it proceeded to outline a new defense in
German law that could have exempted the defendant doctors from
punishment. The crucial fact, as the court viewed the case, was the
Kafkaesque context in which the doctors backstepped into involvement with Hitler's secretive, but supposedly charitable scheme of killing the mentally ill. What the doctors did was blameworthy under
the criminal law; but, the court reasoned, since they believed they
were saving lives and since they acted in a context insulated from the
long-standing values of Western civilization, they should be exempt
from punishment even though they were blameworthy if-the court
hastened to add-they could prove (and in German law that means
proof beyond a reasonable doubt) the facts underlying their claims.
The court was amenable to the defensive claims of the doctors, but by
classifying the defense as extrinsic to the determination of guilt,13 it
enjoyed the flexibility of imposing the burden of persuasion either on
the state or on the defense. By choosing the latter, it qualified the new
defense by requiring the defendant to bear the risk of unsuccessful
proof on his claim for personal exemption for punishment.
The analysis of the High Court for the British Zone evoked vigorous
criticism from German academe. Two of the country's most prestigious
professors, Hans Welzel and Eberhard Schmidt, chastened the court
for improperly classifying the new defense as an issue extrinsic to the
determination of the defendant's guilt. 30 The doctrinal queries of
Welzel and Schmidt may be fully warranted, but they fail to confront
a significant factor in the court's perception of the problem, namely
the impact of the classification on the burden of persuasion. By classi188. Substantive issues extrinsic to blameworthiness are called Strafausschliesungs-

griinde in German law; diplomatic immunity is an example. H. Warr, siupra note 113,
at 53; Peters, Zur Lehre von den persdnlichen Strafausschliessntgsgrilndei, 1919 JuS.

TisciE RuNDscssAu 496.
139. Wehzel, Zum Notstandproblem, 63 7.rrscnHnwr F11 DIE c.aan= S=AmnrarsWssENscHA Sr 47 (1951); Schmidt, Comment, 1949 SLDDEu7sca Junsrrsmzrn.1NrG 559;
Welzel, Comment, 1949 MONATSSCHURF FOR Dnunmcns REchT 373.
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fying the defense as it did, the court had the doctrinal freedom to apply
140
or not to apply the principle of in dubio pro reo to the new defense.
Several characteristics of the doctors' claims in the 1949 euthanasia
cases suggest analogies to developments in the common law. The

court's recognition of the doctors' potential immunity to criminal sanctions represents the creation of a defense that was: (1) previously unknown in German law; (2) vaguely defined and subject to misuse; and
(3) an issue in a politically tense, significant arena of judicial responsibility. The first two of these factors, individually and collectively,
have come to play their part in common law decisions imposing the
burden of persuasion on criminal defendants.
Newly-created defenses are often qualified by the demand that the
defendant bear the burden of persuasion. Illustrative is the Model

Penal Code's position on the defense of mistake of law-a defense
newly fashioned for those relying on ostensibly competent but mistaken legal advice. 141 The defense is among those that challenge the

actor's moral culpability in breaking the law. If a man has acted
reasonably in informing himself of his legal obligations, then surely
he is not to blame for fortuitously contravening a rule of which he is
excusably ignorant.142 The German courts view the defense of mistake
of law as inconsistent with the defendant's culpability, and thus they
routinely apply the maxim in dubio pro reo in disputes on the issues.
The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, demands that the defen143
dant prove a mistake of law by a preponderance of the evidence.
Is the position of the Model Penal Code justified as a matter of
principle or is it simply a compromise designed to muster support for
the new defense? The tone of the Code's official commentary on the
defense is one of guarded approval; no justification is offered for imposing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. 144 This is as one
would expect. The legislative instinct for compromise often results
in qualified action; and imposing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant is a subtle, inconspicuous way of qualifying a new defense.
And the compromise seems harmless. The defendant has a greater
tactical advantage than he had before (there is an additional issue on
which he might be acquitted), so he should not be heard to complain

140. In his later work on the subject, Welzel acknowledges the itplicatlons of the

doctrinal analysis on the burden of persuasion. ,Velzel, supra note 139, at 47, 55 (1951).
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
142. See Houlgate, Ignorantia Juris: A Plea for Justice, 78 ETHics 32 (1967).
143. AIODEL PNAL CODE § 2.04(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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that the legislature or court is taking away in part that which they
have bestowed on him. Yet a political compromise should be recognized for what it is. It is not a stand based on principle, on a perception of just policy. It is but a maneuver made for the sake of law
reform.
The Model Penal Code's stand on the defense of mistake of law
reflects another of the factors present in the case of the German
euthanasists, namely the fear that guilty men might find shelter in the
ambiguities and crevices of defensive issues. To guard against that prospect, courts insist upon persuasive proof that the defense applies. The
fear that the law will be abused pervades common law thinking. It has
left its deepest mark in areas like insanity and mistake, where proof
of the issue has seemed to depend inordinately on the defendant's
testimony. The common law judges reasoned that the defendant's
psychological and mental processes are inaccessible to prosecutorial
proof. Thus, they demanded and still do demand in a substantial
number of jurisdictions that the defendant prove a claim of insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence.145 In the area of mistake, the
common law judges went even further. They refused to recognize mistake of law as a defense; and they rejected consideration of mistakes of
fact in cases ranging from statutory rape to possession of adulterated
foodstuffs. 146 To avoid the risk of abuse, the common law judges destroyed the defenses they feared; sometimes partially, as by transferring
the burden of persuasion to the defendant; and sometimes totally, as
by supplanting the defense of mistake of fact by standards of strict
liability.
Denying defenses to charges of culpable conduct whether totally or
partially, increases the risk that morally innocent men will suffer
criminal sanctions. Whether the fear of acquitting the guilty justifies
that risk depends on the strength of the concern for justice to the individual. It depends, in short, on how earnestly one subscribes to the
postulate that the morally guilty, and only they, may justly be punished under the criminal law. The trend of Western law, as revealed
by the growing number of issues in an increasing number of jurisdictions on which the prosecutor bears the risk of residual doubt, expresses a general commitment to that postulate.
To urge the universal adoption of comprehensive rules of liability,
one need not argue that courts should never defer to their fears that
145.

See note 13 supra.

146. See note 40 supra.
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particular defensive institutions might be misued by mendacious defendants. So far as courts are subject to these fears, they may respond
to them by imposing on the defendant the burden of going forward on
the issue; that is, as a condition of the defendant's right to an instruction to the jury on the issue, they can require him to raise a reasonable
doubt on his behalf with regard to his claim. His unsupported, incredulous protestations of mistake need carry no more weight than an
unsupported claim that he was insane or intoxicated at the time of the

deed. After a man has kidnapped a boy and held him for ransom, it
will not do-absent credible psychiatric testimony-for him to argue
that he was mistaken either about what he was doing or about the
legality of kidnapping. It is not clear why one should fear the wisdom
of jurymen to cope with unfounded claims of insanity or of mistake;
but if fear there be, the burden of going forward provides a sufficient
1 47
institutional check against acquitting the guilty.
VI.

Comprehensive Rules: The Underlying View

The Western trend toward comprehensive rules of liability finds expression in the German tripartite structure of guilt-related issues, in
the centrality of the concept of guilt in the thinking of many American
courts, and in the writing of contemporary French scholars urging
parallel reforms in France. The trend toward comprehensive rules in
criminal cases is more than a post hoc rationalization for burdenof.
proof developments favorable to criminal defendants. Comprehensive
rules stand for a specific view of the criminal process, a view that contrasts sharply with that underlying the model represented by the litigation of private disputes. Specifically, comprehensive rules stand for
a process of fact-finding in which (a) the prosecutor represents the interests of the community and not those of specific groups of persons,
and (b) the focus of the fact-finding process is the justification for invoking criminal sanctions, not on the adjustment of interests between
competing classes of litigants. Each of these characteristics warrant

review.
A.

The Prosecutor'sConstituency
In a private action for the collection of an unpaid debt, proof by
the plaintiff that the debt was incurred imposes on the parties the

147. On the possible constitutional impediments of using the burden of going for.
ward for this purpose, see note 83 supra.
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roles of creditor and debtor. Allocation of the burden of persuasion
on the issue of payment, then, functions to enhance the interests of
either creditors or debtors as litigants. Can one say that the criminal
prosecutor similarly represents the interests of a specific class of persons? One might regard the prosecutor as the representative either of
the victims of the crime or of the class of persons threatened by the
activity charged. The interests of these groups bear on the criminal
process at the stage of sentencing (in the form, respectively, of the
retributive and deterrent aims of punishment), and one may be
tempted to think that they should play a part as well in adjusting
the risks of fact-finding at trial. The argument that they should would
run like this: in private cases one delineates classes of litigants with
competing interests, e.g., debtors and creditors, pedestrians and motorists; and one can do the same in many criminal disputes, e.g., bankrobbers and banks, those causing harm and those suffering harm. As
we invariably promote the welfare of one class of litigants or another
in regulating the burden of persuasion in private cases, so we unavoidably do the same in criminal cases. It is a problem of policy that
we cannot ignore; either we favor the prosecutor and the interests for
which he stands, or we favor the defendant.
The argument turns on the premise that specific threshold issues
might function in criminal cases as guidelines for delineating competing classes of litigants. As the creation of a debt is a threshold issue at
private law, so one assumes that the intentional causing of harm could
serve as a threshold issue in criminal cases. It is at this point in the
argument that comprehensive rules, and the underlying view of the
criminal process they represent, pose a challenge. Under comprehensive
rules, all issues are of equal importance; there is no threshold issue
short of the ultimate inquiry in the case: the personal guilt of the
defendant for having unpermittedly caused harm. Thus, there could
be only one significant classification of litigants in criminal cases: those
who are guilty of crime and those who are not. But this is hardly a
classification relevant to assigning risks in the process of determining
guilt, for the classification presupposes the results of the inquiry, i.e.,
the guilt of the defendant.
If one were to regard the criminal process primarily as a means for
channeling private demands for vengeance, 4"8 one might wish to con148. This is said to be one of the functions of a primitive system of penal sanctions.
Jt., Tan CO.NION LAW 2-3 (1881); R. CHEmY, Tim Gnmow, oF Cz aW.AL
LAw iN ANcINr ComrruNns 8-12 (1890).
O.V. HOLMES,
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sider the interests of the victims even at the stage of determining the
defendant's guilt or innocence. The desire for vengeance may well be
directed at one who faultlessly brings on social harm. In an unresolvable dispute as to whether the defendant started the fight in which he
slew his opponent, one might reason that an acquittal would leave
no recourse to the deceased's family but violent self-help. The victims
would be willing to blame the defendant even if others had doubts as
to who started the fight. Thus, with this concern predominant, one
would readily support a policy of requiring the defendant to prove his
claim of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Such an
allocation of the burden of persuasion would decrease the likelihood
of acquittals in cases in which private parties, unnerved by the defendant's behavior, might resort to violence to "do justice" on their

own terms.
Although comprehensive rules of liability apply independently of the
rationale for imposing criminal sanctions, society may tend to acknowledge the need for such rules only after it has rejected the view that
criminal punishment serves primarily as a surrogate for private vengeance. If actual guilt is the threshold condition of punishment, then
one cannot fairly blame a man on proof of fewer than all issues relevant
to his blameworthiness. It is irrelevant that the victims of the harm
might have their own view of the facts or that they might be insensitive
to the sophisticated reasons for excusing and justifying the causing of
harm. If all issues of criminal liability are yokes in comprehensive rules,
then one necessarily denies deference to less sophisticated private standards for blaming-standards focusing, say, only on intending and
causing harm.
To summarize, then, the view that the prosecutor's constituency is a
class of private individuals, either those harmed or those threatened by
the type of crime, conflicts with the principle that the personal guilt
of the defendant is the threshold inquiry of the process of criminal
adjudication. Furthermore, a concern for private standards of blaming
suggests the antiquated view that the function of criminal punishment
is to channel private demands for vengeance.
It is conventionally held that at least for some purposes public
prosecutors represent the interests of the entire community. Does that
suggest that the interests of the community should bear on adjusting
the risk of convictions at trial? True, criminal convictions further the
common{ go6d; they deter socially harmful behavior and they provide
for the confinement of potentially dangerous men. To further these
interests, one need only adjust the risks of fact-finding at trial to in-
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crease the rate of convictions. But that would directly increase the
risk that innocent men would suffer criminal sanctions. The interests
of the commonweal thus collide with those of innocent men, and accordingly with the legitimate interests of all defendants not yet convicted of crime. The way to resolve this conflict, however, is not to
transfer to the defendant the burden of persuasion on some defensive
issues. That would increase the rate of convictions-but at the cost of
discriminating against defendants relying on those particular claims.
The plane for resolving the conflict is the determination, generally,
of the quantum of proof required for the prosecutor to sustain his
case. Reducing the requisite quantum of proof would likewise increase
the rate of convictions, but rather than discriminating against defendants relying on particular claims, an overall adjustment of the balance
between the state and the accused would disadvantage all defendants
equally. Should the prosecutor have to demonstrate guilt by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or merely by a preponderance of the evidence? The former standard, the standard consistently favored by
legal systems here and abroad, expresses the supremacy of individual
interests in the Western legal tradition. It does not deny that the
prosecutor represents the concededly valid interests of society as a
whole; rather, it recognizes that because society is in a sense arrayed as
a whole against the individual defendant, there is a special risk of
abuse and hence a justification for stringent protection of the defendant by a requirement that his guilt be proved to a near certainty.

".B. Justifying Criminal Sanctions
The emergence of comprehensive rules of liability reflects a reorientation of the criminal process. In the course of a hundred years, the
focus of the process has shifted from the superficial similarities of civil
and criminal trials to a broader view of the criminal process. And
from this broader perspective, the criminal process appears not as a
a conflict between litigants, but as a process for determining whether
the state's officials may justly deprive an individual of his freedom. A
Wyoming judge, writing in 1889, stated this view of the criminal
process eloquently:
The doctrine that the burden never falls upon the accused does
not arise in favorem vitae, or out of any pity or sympathy for the
prisoner, but it arises out of the nature of what the sovereign
power voluntarily undertakes to do before it will ask piconviction
for crime at the hands of a jury.149
149.

Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 284, 21 P. 1081-83 (1889) (Corn, J.).
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And what does the sovereign power undertake to do before it will
ask for a criminal conviction? At minimum, the state must come forth
with a justification for condemning the accused as a criminal and depriving him of his liberty. In civil proceedings to commit persons of
serious danger to the community, the justificatory rationale is utilitarian; it is the danger to the community that justifies a quarantine of
its source. If dangerousness-or particular kinds of dangerousness-is
a justification for confinement, then the class of persons subject to the
sanction is self-defining. Only those who pose the requisite kind of
danger to others are eligible, and the selection of committable individuals out of this class depends entirely on the quantum of proof
(i.e., the certainty of the danger) required for commitment. In the case
of criminal sanctions, however, the ends to be served are not in themselves a sufficient justification. Even men of minimal or undetermined
dangerousness suffer these sanctions. Their condemnation and punishment serve not only or not even primarily directly to protect society,
but rather to reinforce community norms and thus indirectly to deter
deviant behavior. But these purposes would be served by the punishment of vast numbers of persons-indeed of any person who brings
about a result prohibited by the legislature. Since no one reared in the
Western tradition would countenance such indiscriminate use of criminal sanctions, the crucial problem becomes the selection of the individuals who are to be sacrificed for the community's general welfare.
Thus, if one accepts general deterrence as an aim of the criminal system, the question to be answered in individual criminal trials is which
among the many individuals who might usefully serve that general
aim may justly be punished to that end.
The minimal demand of Western legal systems is that the state
may punish only those individuals who have acted contrary to legal
commands. But this is merely the minimal demand of justice. Of all
men who engage in prohibited behavior, some might act with good
reasons and some might act involuntarily. To ignore claims of justification and excuse and to punish all violators alike would be to discriminate unfairly against men whose violation of the law is morally
innocent. On the other hand, by proving that the defendant violated
the law and did so culpably, the state places the accused in a category
of men of equal moral liability to punishment. No one in the class
of blameworthy offenders has standing to argue that he alone should
be exempt from liability for what he has done. The only argument
open to a blameworthy offender is a challenge to the penal system as
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a whole.150 On the assumption that the state justifiably punishes culpable offenders in the name of public order and social control, the
prosecutor is able to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions in individual cases: he need only demonstrate that the individual accused
has culpably violated the law. That much the state voluntarily undertakes to do before it will ask a jury for a conviction.
Both formally and substantively, comprehensive rules of liability
stress the state's obligation to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. Formally, comprehensive rules provide a justificatory rationale
by stating the necessary and sufficient substantive conditions for imposing sanctions according to the law. Substantively, comprehensive
rules reflect a specific justificatory rationale for imposing criminal sanctions; this they do by expressing the equal relevance of all issues related to the defendant's blameworthiness in violating the law.
Comprehensive rules provide a medium for viewing the criminal

process in proper perspective. They serve to set the process off from
the litigation of private disputes; they provide emphasis anew on the
state's obligation to justify the use of criminal sanctions. Above all,
they serve to minimize the risk that innocent men will suffer under
the criminal law. These are the benefits of the historical trend toward
comprehensive rules of liability.
150. Caveat: I reserve for more careful deliberation whether the state justly punishes
a man who disobe)s an unjust law with the expectation of suffering legal consequences.
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